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Abstract 
  
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, carried out via aircraft hijackings, 
clearly demonstrated the massive destruction potential when vulnerabilities in the 
aviation system are exploited.  Airport security measures have since been strengthened 
and new measures have been set in place.  With the passage of the Aviation 
Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 the checked baggage systems at U.S. 
Airports are now required to screen all checked bags with explosive detection devices.  
This is a significant increase from the small percentage of bags that were previously 
screened.  The original 2009 deadline was changed to 31 December 2002 and this change 
forced airports to implement interim screening systems.  These systems can impact the 
efficient processing of passengers and baggage.  A long term solution is needed for a 100 
percent checked baggage system that provides the required security while minimizing 
negative impacts to aviation stakeholders including the airport operators, airlines, 
passengers, and the Transportation Security Administration.  This thesis, focusing on the 
Dayton International Airport, uses a Value Focused Thinking methodology to build a 
value model for evaluating potential long term solutions for 100 percent checked baggage 
system alternatives.
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LONG TERM IMPLEMENTATION OF 
A 100 PERCENT BAGGAGE SREENING SYSTEM: 
A VALUE FOCUSED THINKING APPROACH 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 The aviation system of the United States consists of more than 400 hundred 
airports and thousands of aircraft serving over 2 million passengers each day (GAO/T 
RCED-00-125:3).  Both the U.S. and global economies are dependent upon a reliable and 
safe means of air transportation.  Security for the aviation system in the United States has 
historically been the responsibility of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) which 
was created in 1958 and became part of the Department of Transportation in 1967.  
 The very features of the aviation system that allow it to function so effectively 
make it susceptible to terrorist attacks.  Most airports were designed prior to major 
concerns about security.  Airports were designed with large open and generally accessible 
areas.  Each airport is unique in its layout, number of airline carriers, and other 
stakeholders.  Airports, and their associated support facilities, are scattered throughout 
the nation.  The dispersed nature of our aviation system makes it difficult to secure all 
possible vulnerabilities.  Airports were designed for efficient and cost effective travel.  
Security measures often add time to travel and make the travel system less efficient.  In 
addition, public airports are owned and operated by diverse state and local governments.    
Airports are integrated parts of the economy in many cities, with communities relying on 
them to bring in business travelers and tourists.  
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 Airports continue to be vulnerable targets.  The introduction of new and improved 
security measures has unfortunately been mainly reactive to the type of terrorist event 
that occurred and mitigated the exploited vulnerability.  One such security measure is the 
screening of passengers, as well as their carry on and checked bags, for weapons and 
explosives (NMAB 482-3:1998: v). 
 On 21 December 1988, Pan American Flight 103 exploded over Lockerbie 
Scotland as a result of an explosive device hidden inside a suitcase.  In response to this 
terrorist act, the U.S. enacted the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990.  Through 
this act the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began funding the development of 
Explosive Detection System (EDS) technology to be used to screen checked baggage. 
The FAA continued to expand its EDS technology purchases and certifications (NMAB 
482-3:1998: v).  In 1994, the FAA approved the first EDS system, Invision CTX 5000, 
for use at U.S. Airports.  The international aviation community also responded to the Pan 
American Flight tragedy with the use of EDS technology.  The United Kingdom began to 
install EDS machines for airport checked baggage systems in 1990.  By 1998, all 
commercial airports in the U.K. had 100 percent screening of checked baggage.  The 
target date goal within the U.S. for 100 percent screening originally established by the 
FAA was 2009.  However, recent events changed that time horizon.  
 On 11 Sept 2001, terrorists demonstrated how our transportation system could be 
used as a means to carry out new acts of destruction, literally making weapons out of 
passenger aircraft.  These acts highlighted weaknesses within the aviation transportation 
system.  These weaknesses include the limited capabilities of airport security to screen all 
potential terrorists and their weapons from boarding aircraft.  These acts also increased 
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public awareness to the fact that not all checked baggage was being screened for 
explosives.     
 The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established with the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act of Nov 19, 2001(Public Law 107-71).  This law 
assigned the responsibility of aviation security to the TSA.  This act also included several 
security mandates with implementation deadlines.  One of the mandates was the 
requirement to have 100 percent of checked bags screened with EDS technology by the 
end of 31 December 2002.  The short timeframe (19 November 2001 to 31 December 
2002) given to the newly formed TSA and airports to meet the mandate of 100 percent 
baggage screening forced the implementation of interim systems, without the time and 
resources necessary to fully accommodate all potential concerns of the stakeholders 
impacted by the system.  These concerns would have normally been captured during the 
lengthier design process that was anticipated by the FAA’s earlier stated 2009 deadline.  
To satisfy the 31 December 2002 mandate, some airports installed large, heavy EDS 
machines in the airport lobbies, impacting lobby floor space due to the sizable EDS 
machines and additional queuing lines necessary for passengers to hand carry their 
checked bags to these screening machines.  With the mandate met and the immediate 
threat mitigated, there is now time to consider additional relevant issues and objectives 
involved with selecting a long term solution for a 100 percent checked baggage system.    
1.2 Problem Statement 
 The objective of this study is to assist the stakeholders of the aviation system with 
the long term implementation of the 100 percent checked baggage screening.  While 
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every effort was made to consider all relevant factors while meeting this mandate, not all 
concerns were articulated and considered in the reduced implementation timeline. Using 
a decision analysis methodology known as Value Focused Thinking (VFT), the values 
important to a long term solution of a checked baggage system can be captured in a value 
hierarchy model.  VFT is a process for capturing values that can be used to create 
alternatives to decision problems as well as evaluate how well different alternatives meet 
the expressed values. (Keeney, 1997:3) 
 Airport security involves many stakeholders including the passengers, airlines, 
airports, the FAA, the TSA, and public communities.  The level of security to be 
provided must be balanced against the effect that a security level will have on the 
efficiency of operations, that which will be tolerated by the passengers, and that which 
the government, (local, state, regional, and federal), airports, and airlines can afford to 
implement.  The VFT methodology assists in the evaluation and balancing of these values 
for various competing objectives as well as capturing their importance to the decision-
maker into a value hierarchy model.   
1.3 Problem Approach 
 Airport security depends on an evolving science with new technologies and 
systems constantly being introduced and tested.  Dayton International Airport, as well as 
all other commercial airports across the country, has implemented a 100 percent baggage 
checking system.  The checked baggage system in place at Dayton International Airport 
is an interim solution.  EDS and explosive trace detection machines (ETD) were placed in 
the airport lobby in front of airline check in counters.  Passengers hand carry their bags to 
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the screening machines after checking in with the airlines.  Once the bags are cleared in 
the passenger’s presence, the bags are left with the TSA personnel and then transferred to 
the airlines. Meanwhile, the passengers move to the passenger screening area and 
departure gates. 
 The long term solution for the checked baggage system includes multiple 
objectives such as the prevention of incidents that could harm passengers, maintaining an 
efficient flow of passengers, and the public acceptance of security measures.  Focusing 
on what objectives are valuable for a long term solution will lead to the creation of a 
value hierarchy that captures the value of checked baggage systems.  This value driven 
approach can also lead to the development of alternatives that were not previously 
foreseen. 
1.4 Research Scope 
 The decision perspective for this thesis is from that of the Dayton International 
Airport’s Director of Aviation as well as the airport’s stakeholders (Airlines, TSA, and 
Passengers).  The focus of this research provides support to the personnel responsible for 
managing and implementing a 100 percent checked baggage system as well as those 
stakeholders affected by the system.  Tangible benefits from this study are applicable to 
other airports, as they face the same challenges.  This study does not address specific 
airport security vulnerabilities or measures that would require this document to be 
classified.   
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1.5 Overview and Format 
 This thesis is organized into five chapters.  A literature review of airport security 
law, regulations for checked baggage, as well as an introduction into VFT is provided in 
Chapter 2.  A presentation of the value of checked baggage system, how this value is 
measured using VFT, and how it can be applied to decision makers in the area of airport 
security is provided in Chapter 3.  A demonstration of this value model using two 
notional alternatives is provided in Chapter 4.  Conclusions from this study, as well as 
recommendations for further research, are provided in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
 This chapter provides a review of the pertinent literature in the field of airport 
security and decision analysis.  This includes the laws and regulations that assign 
responsibility and direct the implementation of airport security to various stakeholders.  
The decision analysis method of Value Focused Thinking (VFT) is also reviewed.  A 
description of how this method can benefit airport security is also provided.    
2.1 Transportation Security 
 The medium of transportation involves moving people, goods, and services 
around the nation and the globe via highway, rail, waterways, and air.  Terrorists 
exploited the vulnerabilities of the aviation system on 11 September 2001, turning jet 
airliners into guided missiles.  The Transportation Research Board suggests the following 
characteristics of transportations systems make them vulnerable targets for future terrorist 
attacks (TRB Special Report 270, 2002:1-3).   
1. Openness and Accessibility – Most of the transportation system was 
built prior to concern with terrorism and must be accessible to the 
public  
 
2. Extent and Ubiquity – There are over 400 commercial airports and 
14,000 general aviation airports dispersed across the country 
 
3. Efficiency and Competitiveness – The various modes of transportation 
require maximum efficiency to allow for competition between them.   
 
4. Owner, Overseer, and Operator Diversity – The public sector owns 
and operates much of the transportation infrastructure such as airports 
and railroads.   
 
5. Entwinement in Society and Global Economy – highways, railways, 
airways, and waterways connect small towns and major cities across 
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the nation and support the economy through tourism, mail delivery, 
daily commuting travel, and the delivery of products and services  
 
These very features, which support the efficiency and effectiveness of the nation’s 
transportation system, leave it vulnerable to exploitation. 
2.2 FAA and TSA RESPONSIBILITIES 
 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) was created in 1958 to be 
responsible for a safe aviation system.  The FAA is a principal government organization 
responsible for regulating the design and operating standards of airports.  One of the 
FAA’s objectives is to reduce vulnerabilities of the air travel system to terrorist threats.  
This was accomplished with procedures and supporting technologies to detect, deter, and 
react to these threats before they can cause harm.  In response to the bombing of Pan 
American Flight 103 the FAA issued a directive to purchase technology capable of 
detecting explosives in checked bags.  The most advanced technology available at that 
time was Thermal Neutron Analysis (TNA) machines.  After testing, the FAA discovered 
that the TNA machines were not capable of detecting explosives at low enough levels 
necessary to detect all critical quantities of explosives, such as the amount of explosive 
believed to have been used on Pan Am Flight 103.  The FAA continued making efforts 
towards other detection systems.  The FAA began testing of EDS machines in 1990 and 
developed classified certification criteria in 1993.  These criteria include standards for 
various types of explosives, baggage throughput rates, and acceptable rates for false 
alarm and detection (GAO/RCED 97-119, 1997:3).  The first approved EDS system 
received FAA certification in 1994; it was the INVISON CTX-5000.  The FAA then 
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began deploying EDS machines at select airports over the course of the next several 
years.   
The Aviation Security Improvement Act of 2000 required the FAA to gradually 
increase the number of checked bags being screened by EDS machines to reach 100 
percent screening of checked baggage by 2009.  The terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 
led to passing of the Air Transportation and Security Act (ATSA) of 2001.  This act 
created the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and gave this organization the 
responsibility for security in all modes of transportation.   
The TSA took over primary responsibility for aviation security on 17 February 
2002. The ATSA of 2001 mandated that 100 percent of checked baggage be screened 
with EDS machines by 31 December 2002.  This new date required the deployment of 
these large, heavy EDS machines to 429 commercial airports with little time to consider 
how they would effect processing of passengers and their bags.  Many airports were not 
designed with the necessary floor space required to accommodate these machines or with 
the space needed to adequately integrate them into baggage handling systems.  The TSA, 
along with the various airports and airlines were forced to implement the best alternative 
attainable within the short timeframe.    
2.3 Implementing 100 Percent Checked Baggage Screening 
 A white paper prepared by RAND examined the FAA plans for implementation of 
the EDS machines to meet the 31 December 02.  This study identified several problems 
with the implementing the deployment schedule. One of these problems reinforces the 
need for an airport level study.  
10 
 
The FAA’s “top-down” approach does not adequately consider local 
constraints, such as the size of the airport terminal.  It is space constraints, 
not machine availability that is the proverbial long pole in the tent.  Until 
suitable airport facilities are constructed, many of the EDS machines now 
being acquired at a highly accelerated rate cannot be installed (Kauvar, 
Rostker, and Shaver, 2002:4) 
 
Whether new facilities are built or existing facilities are modified, the objectives of the 
stakeholders affected by 100 percent checked baggage screening should be identified.  
These objectives can then be incorporated into the decision making process for selection 
of the system most suited for a particular airport.  
Dayton International Airport, as with airports around the country, has interim 
measures in place to satisfy the 100 percent screening requirement. The long term 
solutions to satisfy the requirement while meeting the objectives of the airports, airlines, 
and TSA have yet to be resolved.  A report prepared by the FAA provided the following 
planning considerations for future checked baggage screening (Lazarick and Cammaroto, 
2001:92). 1 
 1. Adequate space allocation for equipment 
 
 2. Queuing space  
 
 3. Adequate power sources 
 
 4. Communications and environmental equipment 
 
 5. Adequate floor loading 
 
6. Appropriate facilities where passengers and their baggage can be reunited 
for the purpose of alarm resolution 
 
Other considerations include a system that will provide convenience to the passenger, 
maximize the throughput of bags, minimize the impact on airline personnel, and 
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maximize the effectiveness of security.   The Dayton International Airport must 
implement a long term solution that will best satisfy the objectives for security while not 
losing focus on the fact that the airport is a business and the passengers are the customers 
who have objectives to be included as well.  It is the stakeholders at the airport level that 
will best provide the objectives and considerations most important in a 100 percent 
checked baggage system.  
2.4 Decision Analysis 
 Determining which checked baggage system alternative is best suited to meet the 
objectives of the Dayton International Airport stakeholders is a complex problem.  There 
are several different alternatives available to the airport.  Each alternative has its pros and 
cons, and each satisfies the various objectives differently.  These objectives include: How 
does the system impact passenger convenience?  Will the system require more manpower 
from the airport and airlines than the current system?  Will the system require more 
terminal floor space or construction of new facilities?  There are a number of checked 
baggage system alternatives and numerous objectives that each alternative should be 
evaluated against.  A multi-objective decision analysis technique can provide the 
methodology necessary to clearly layout this problem.  Decision analysis can be used to 
handle problems with several variables and objectives that would otherwise be too 
complicated and confusing.    
2.4.1 Introduction to Decision Analysis 
Decision Analysis (DA) is a “prescriptive approach designed for normally 
intelligent people who want to think hard and systematically about some important real 
12 
problems” (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976: vii).  Decision Analysis allows problems to be 
evaluated with an assortment of structures such as decision trees, influence diagrams, and 
value hierarchies (Clemen, 1996:2).   Through decision analysis the decision maker is 
able to better structure complex decisions, gain additional insight to the problem, and 
consider the trade offs between multiple objectives.    
2.4.2 Alternative versus Value Focused Thinking 
The standard approach to decision making is alternative focused thinking.  This is 
the process of reviewing the existing alternatives in search of the best one.  Decision 
makers limit themselves through Alternative Focused Thinking.  It is possible that not 
one currently available alternative is best suited for the decision maker.  Value Focused 
Thinking (VFT) is an approach that relies on the values important to the decision maker 
(Keeney, 1992:6).  These values are used to structure a value model that can be used to 
generate the best alternative.  The VFT approach requires the decision maker to answer 
the questions about what is of value with regard to the decision to be made.    
2.5 Value Focused Thinking  
Decision analysis and VFT have been used to successfully assist decision makers 
in several different private, public, and government organizations.  Keefer, Corner, and 
Kirkwood (2000) performed a literature review of the major operations research journals 
from 1990 to 1999.  Their review included articles and texts that used decision analysis 
methods as well.  The review included 57 application articles grouped into Energy, 
Services and Manufacturing, Medical, Military, Public Policy, and General categories. 
Their literature review highlights the fact that decision analysis and VFT have been 
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applied in a wide variety of fields.  Two such examples are outlined in the next few 
paragraphs. 
VFT was used to “examine the concepts, capabilities, and technologies the United 
States will require to remain the dominant air and space force in the future (Jackson, 
Jones, and Lehmkul, 1996:iii).  In 1995, General Ronald R. Fogleman, the Air Force 
Chief of Staff, tasked Air University to “generate ideas and concepts on the capabilities 
the United States will require to possess the dominant air and space forces in the future”.  
This study, entitled Air Force 2025, and an accompanying value model was developed 
using the VFT methodology to select the best systems and technologies for the Air Force 
given alternative futures (Jackson, Jones, and Lehmkul, 1996). The value model created 
was very robust; it included 134 force qualities, each with a measure of merit and value 
function. A value model with this detail can be used to evaluate a diverse set of systems.  
This model was also used to forecast decisions further in the future than any known 
military value model (Jackson, Jones, and Lehmkul, 1996:14).  
 VFT was also used in a study to assist action officers at the Air Force Force 
Protection Battlelab in their evaluation method used for potential force protection 
initiatives.  The VFT process enabled the action officers to create a value model 
quantifying the objectives important to the Air Force.  Previously, the Battlelab relied on 
the skills of the action officers to present and defend their interpretation of proposed 
initiatives rather than comparing each initiative based on an equivalent set of merits and 
the relative benefit of each proposed initiative (Jurk, 2002).  
Clearly, VFT has been used to assist in a number of complex decision 
environments.   
14 
2.5.1 Benefits of VFT 
 The following figure from Keeney’s text provides an overview of how VFT can 
benefit the decision making process. 
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Evaluating
alternatives
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stakeholder
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Thinking
About
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Keeney, 1992: 24
 
Figure 1: Benefits of Value Focused Thinking 
 “The language of value-focused thinking is the common language about the 
achievement of objectives in any particular decision context” (Keeney 1997:25).  As a 
result, the participants in this type of problem solving are not limited to those with 
technical expertise and the identification of objectives can be made with a greater amount 
of understanding.  By using the language of values rather than alternatives, stakeholders 
can focus on the conflicts that may arise within these values rather than conflicts in which 
alternative they personally believe to be the best.  
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2.6 10 Step Process for VFT 
The VFT methodology allows decision makers to obtain a value model which 
includes everything important to the decision maker.  The process can be divided into 10 
steps which are provided in the Figure 2 (Shoviak, 2001: 63).  Shoviak developed this 
framework in part based on the work of Keeney (1992), Kirkwood (1997), and Kloeber 
(2000) who examine the use of Value Focused Thinking in decisions with multiple 
objectives.   These steps are not sequential but and are meant to be performed in an 
interactive manner. These 10 steps for VFT will be used as the methodology framework 
for conducting this study.  
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Figure 2: VFT: 10 Step Process 
2.6.1 Step 1: Problem Identification 
 During this first step the decision maker should ask “What is the fundamental 
issue?”  Identifying the overall objective of the problem clearly during this step will 
ensure the rest of the steps can be used effectively in order to solve the problem in the 
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best manner.  As an example, consider a fundamental objective of choosing the best 
sports car.  This example will be used to assist in illustrating the VFT methodology.   
A poorly defined problem will most likely lead to an unwanted or useless value model.   
2.6.2 Step 2: Create Value Hierarchy 
A value hierarchy begins with a fundamental objective as defined in Step 1.  The 
fundamental objective is then decomposed into sub-objectives which provide more detail.  
Each sub-objective is expanded until it can be defined by a single attribute.   
There are five desirable properties of a value hierarchy; small size, operability, 
completeness, non-redundancy, and decomposability.  (Kirkwood, 1997:16).  The small 
size is important because that helps in the ease of understanding.  A very large hierarchy 
with hundreds of objectives can be too difficult to understand.  The small size property 
leads into the operable property.  This methodology is used to assist decision makers and 
therefore it should be able to do just that.  A model that is not easy to use or understand is 
often not operable.  The completeness property describes the need for the hierarchy to 
provide enough detail so that key features of the fundamental objective are discernable 
and the differences in these features are captured by the hierarchy. The completeness 
property is often referred to as collectively exhaustive.  The non-redundancy property 
describes the need to have a hierarchy that does not include more than one objective that 
describes the same feature.  This is also referred to as mutual exclusivity.   
Continuing with the “Buy the Best Sports Car” example, Figure 3 illustrates a 
hierarchy starting with the fundamental objective of buying the best sports car.  The 
fundamental objective is decomposed into three sub-objectives which are functionality, 
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performance, and safety.  These sub-objectives are decomposed one more time until the 
sub-objectives are reached that can be measured.    
SafetyPerformanceFuntionality
Room
Buy the Best
Sports Car
Acceleration Power
Crash Test
Rating
 
Figure 3: Buy Best Sports Car Value Hierarchy 
2.6.3 Step 3: Develop Evaluation Measures 
For this step measures are assigned to each of the lowest level sub-objectives. 
Measures have scales which are either natural or constructed and direct or proxy.  A 
Natural scale is one that is already accepted by most people. An example is miles per 
gallon which is commonly used for vehicle fuel efficiency. A constructed scale is created 
for a specific decision to quantify how well a sub-objective is met. “A direct scale 
measures the degree of attainment of an objective, while a proxy scale reflects the degree 
of attainment of its associated objective, but does not directly measure this”(Kirkwood, 
1997:24).  A direct scale can provide a direct measurement for how well a sub-objective 
is satisfied.  The miles per gallon measure is also an example of a measure with a direct 
scale.  A proxy scale provides a representation for how well a sub-objective is satisfied. 
An example of a direct scale is human age in years.  An example of a proxy scale is the 
gross national product (GNP) which is often used to describe the development of a 
19 
country (Kirkwood, 1997:24).  Continuing with the “Buy the Best Sports Car”example, 
measures for each of the lowest tier sub-objectives are shown on the bottom level of the 
hierarchy in Figure 4.  In this example there are two measures for the Room sub-
objective.  These measures are the number of seats and the leg room.  The upper and 
lower bounds for the scales are then developed for each measure that captures the range 
of feasible data.  For the Number of Seats measure, the upper and lower bounds are 5 and 
2 respectively, for example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Buy Best Sports Car Value Hierarchy with measures 
2.6.4 Step 4: Create Value Functions 
Value Functions are used to assign a value from 0 to 1 to data for each measure 
for each alternative.  These value functions are single dimensional and are either 
monotonically increasing or decreasing functions.  Two common types of value functions 
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are the exponential and piecewise linear.  An example of an exponential and piecewise 
value functions are provided in Figure 5.  Both of these functions are monotonically 
increasing.  The functions increase in value on the Y-axis as the score increases on the x-
axis.  The piecewise linear function has two different slopes that convert the x-axis score 
to a y-axis value.  An exponential value function that is monotonically decreasing is 
provided in Figure 6.   
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Figure 5: Exponential and Piecewise Linear Value Functions 
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Figure 6: Exponential Value Function 
2.6.5 Step 5: Weight Hierarchy 
The decision maker is unlikely to value each objective of the value hierarchy 
equally.  Therefore, the decision maker will need to assign a weight to each objective to 
represent the importance of each.  The “100 marble method” was used for this study.  The 
decision maker has 100 imaginary marbles to assign to each objective within each branch 
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of each tier of the hierarchy.  The number of marbles assigned represents the relative 
preference of the objectives.  The 100 marbles are notional, and are used to assist the 
decision maker in assigning direct weights to the hierarchy.  
The example hierarchy for the Buy Best Sports Car example has been given 
weights as shown in Figure 7.  Using the 100 marble method the decision maker for this 
problem gave both functionality and safety 20 marbles each and performance 60 marbles.  
The marbles are then divided by 100 so that the total of the weight sums to 1.  The same 
method is applied for the next tier.  Functionality and Safety have one sub-objective each 
so they receive 100 marbles and the corresponding weight is 1.0.   The performance 
objective has two sub-objectives, acceleration and power.  The acceleration and power 
sub-objectives were given 60 and 40 marbles respectively.  Their corresponding weights 
are therefore .60 and .40.  
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Figure 7: Buy Best Sports Car Hierarchy with Weights 
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2.6.6 Step 6: Generate Alternatives 
 Alternatives that appear to satisfy the objectives of the value hierarchy developed 
in Step 2 can be used along with existing alternatives to be evaluated and compared in 
later steps.   
2.6.7 Step 7: Score Alternatives 
 Data for each of the measures developed in Step 3 are now needed for each of the 
alternatives generated in the previous Step.  Each alternative is scored based on the 
SDVF for each measure.  The score for each measure of the hierarchy should be 
determined for all of the alternatives before moving to the next measure.  Scoring is done 
from specific data for natural direct measures to subject matter experts’ opinion for less 
quantitative measures.     
 
2.6.8 Step 8: Deterministic Analysis 
 
 In this study a decision analysis software package, Logical Decisions for 
Windows, was used to input the information and data from the previous steps.  Once the 
data for each measure was input on all of the alternatives an overall value for can be 
computed for each alternative.   
 The overall value for the alternatives is computed using the additive value 
function.  This function uses the SDVF and weights assigned to each measure to create an 
overall score for a given alternative. 
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V(x) is the total value for an alternative, λi  is the weight for each measure from i to n, 
and vi(xi) is the score each measure attains from its value function (Kirkwood, 1997, 230).   
2.6.9 Step 9: Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity Analysis is performed to examine how a change in the assigned 
weights will affect the overall value scores for the alternatives.  This is done by varying 
the weights of an objective from 0 to 1 while maintaining the original proportion of the 
weight with the other objectives.  This can be done at any tier of the hierarchy.  This step 
provides valuable insight to the decision maker.  It highlights the objectives that with a 
realistic change in weighting, effect which alternative receives the highest score.  It can 
also show the insignificance of the weight given to an objective, provided that with any 
reasonable change of it’s weighting, makes no difference to the alternative rankings.  
Such analysis helps to focus weighting efforts on those objectives where a reasonable 
change may alter the decision. 
2.6.10 Step 10: Recommendation and Conclusions 
 Insight gained from the VFT process is now provided to the decision maker to 
include how each alternative ranks and how the alternative scores can be improved with 
the identification of value gaps.  Once the decision maker has been presented with the 
results the value hierarchy can be used again in an iterative method of generating and 
evaluating future alternatives for the same problem.  
 Chapter 2 has provided the basic background required to execute this study.  
Chapter 3 will detail the application of VFT approach to the Dayton International 
Airports 100 percent checked baggage decision environment. 
24 
Chapter 3. Value Model Development 
Chapter 3 develops the value model built for the Dayton International Airport.  
The chapter follows the ten step process discussed in Chapter 2 and presents the elements 
of the model. 
3.1 Step 1: Problem Identification 
 The fundamental objective of this study is to capture the values important in a 100 
percent checked baggage system at the Dayton International Airport.  The system 
includes the screening machines, conveyor system, and personnel responsible for 
screening and handling the checked bags. Specifically, the system of study starts from the 
point where a checked bag is given a flight identification tag at the airline check-in 
counters and ends at the point the bag arrives at the airline make up room.  The make up 
rooms are where the bags are delivered to the airline baggage handlers.  The custody of 
the bags is transferred from TSA to the airlines at this point. Once delivered to the 
respective make up rooms the screening of the bags has been completed and the airline 
personnel can organize and prepare to load them on their planes.   
The decision maker for this problem is the Director of Aviation at Dayton 
International Airport.  The Director of Aviation is concerned with operating a safe airport 
that provides an efficient flow of passengers.  Several stakeholders are involved in the 
operation of an airport and are impacted by a checked baggage screening system.  To 
gain insight and concerns from these stakeholders an integrated study team was formed 
consisting of members of the Director of Aviation’s staff, the TSA Head of baggage 
screening managers and two airline managers from major airlines servicing Dayton 
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International Airport.  The study team was used throughout the model development to 
elicit values and construct measures.     
3.2 Step 2: Construct Value Hierarchy 
For this step, the study team provided the objectives they believed to be important 
to the fundamental objective.  This process consisted of a series of six group sessions.  
The study group started the hierarchy development by creating an affinity diagram for the 
checked baggage system.  Each stakeholder provided what they believed to be the most 
important considerations for the system.  These items were listed individually until all 
concerns were captured and recorded.  The items were then combined into common 
groups.  A total of fifty items of value were grouped under five main headings which are 
Passenger Impact, Efficient, Security, Reliability (which evolved to “Ease of Operation”), 
and Flexibility. The results from the affinity diagram are provided in Table 1.     
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Table 1: Checked Baggage System Affinity Diagram 
Passenger 
Impact 
Efficient Security Reliability   
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- operationally 
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  Flow assurity - 
bags to right 
place 
      
 
These common headings became the initial first tier of the hierarchy. Over the course of 
the next several meetings these 1st tier objectives were refined into sub-objectives.   
 During the affinity diagram process the group also identified cost related items.  
The cost items were treated separately and used to form a cost hierarchy.  The intent was 
to create a cost to benefit comparison between the overall cost given by the cost hierarchy 
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and the benefit captured by the checked baggage system hierarchy.  The benefits and 
costs of each approach would then be analyzed.  The cost hierarchy is discussed after the 
100 percent checked baggage hierarchy.  The complete hierarchy for the 100 percent 
checked baggage system is provided in Figure 8 to illustrate the size and extent of the 
model.  
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Figure 8: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy 
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The five first tier objectives of the checked baggage system hierarchy, starting from the 
left and moving right are Passenger Impact, Efficient, Security, Ease of Operation, and 
Flexibility.  Each first tier objective and corresponding sub-objectives is referred to as a 
branch.  The objectives within this model are discussed in detail beginning with the 
fundamental objective and then by branch, starting with the Passenger Impact branch and 
moving to the right of the hierarchy.  The discussion of each branch includes the 
development of evaluation measures and value functions.  The evaluation measures are 
used for the lowest tier objectives to determine how an alternative meets the objectives.  
The value functions convert actual data for each measure (x-axis) to a value (y-axis). The 
y-axis value ranges from 0 to 1.  A value of 0 represents the least desirable data for a 
measure while a value of 1.0 represents the most desirable data. 
3.2.1 Decompose Fundamental Objective  
The main objective of this checked baggage system hierarchy to provide the best 
long term solution to a 100 percent checked baggage system for the Dayton International 
Airport.  The system will include detection equipment such as Explosive Trace Detection 
(ETD) systems, EDS machines, conveyor systems, and operators necessary to run the 
system.  The approved explosive screening equipment used for any alternative must be 
certified by the FAA as meeting minimum performance standards.  Additionally, the TSA 
must approve the equipment to be used at Dayton International Airport.  There are a 
limited number of manufacturers of explosive detection machines that have been 
approved for use in airports.  The TSA, who currently selects and pays for the EDS 
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equipment, has final approval.  The hierarchy includes objectives that can be used to 
differentiate and recommend using a specific manufacturer’s equipment.   
3.2.2 Passenger Impact Branch 
The Passenger Impact branch includes items derived from the affinity diagram 
process that represent the ‘hassle factor’ for passengers.  The hassle factor is the amount 
of inconvenience the passenger perceives as a result of the checked baggage system.  
While the study group did not include a passenger representative, all members relied on 
their own experiences as passengers, as well as the airport operators and airlines expertise 
in dealing with passengers, to develop objectives for this branch.   
The convenience objectives were broken down into the handling of bags and the 
time needed of the passenger to complete bag screening.  The passenger impact branch 
included an objective for the confidence the passengers have that the system is providing 
effective security, both in the inspection of the baggage for explosives and in the 
protection of their property.  The study group believes that this perception is positive 
when passengers can see that a screening process is taking place.  Figure 9 illustrates the 
sub-objectives that were developed for the Passenger Impact branch of the checked 
baggage system hierarchy.   
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Figure 9: Passenger Impact Branch 
An important part of the hierarchy development is clearly defining the meaning of 
the objectives.  The definitions used for the Passenger Impact Branch objectives and sub-
objectives are provided in Table 2.  The next step for this branch was to define measures 
for each of the lowest tier objectives that can be used to determine how well each 
objective is attained by a 100 percent checked baggage system.     
Table 2: Passenger Impact Sub-objective Definitions 
Passenger Impact Confidence the passenger has that the baggage screening 
system is providing security and the convenience 
provided while doing so. 
   Confidence Trust the passengers has that the screening system is 
protecting him/her from danger 
        Communicate Security Providing information about the security screening 
system through any means such as CCTV, windows, or 
other display devices  
   Convenience Minimizing the work and time required from the 
passenger 
        Handling Bags The effort required from the passenger to clear his/her 
checked bags 
        Time The time required from the passenger to clear his/her 
checked bags 
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Measures were developed for each of the lowest tier sub-objectives.  These measures 
have been added to the Passenger Impact branch and are displayed below the lowest tier 
sub-objectives for this branch in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Passenger Impact Branch with Measures 
A summary of the measure definitions for the Passenger Impact branch are provided in 
Table 3.  The next step for this Branch is to define value functions.  
 
Table 3: Definitions of Passenger Impact Measures 
Measure Definition 
Visible System A system that can be seen by the 
passengers 
Distance (feet) The distance that the passenger has to 
move checked bag in screening process 
Times Handled The number of times the passenger has to 
move checked bag from one screening 
station to another before screeners take 
custody of the bag.  
Time in Line (minutes) The time the passenger is required to wait 
while the checked bag is being screened.  
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3.2.3 Passenger Impact Branch SDVFs 
 The Passenger Impact branch consists of four measures; single dimension value 
functions (SDVF) were developed for each by the study group.  A brief discussion of 
each value function is provided separately.   
3.2.3.1 Visible System 
 
A system that can be seen by the passenger allows the passengers to see that the 
bags are being screened for potential threats.  As stated earlier, it is preferred to have a 
checked baggage system that is visible.  This visibility can be provided by means such as 
a closed circuit television, window to screening operation area, or a display system 
illustrating the routing of the bags to screening machines.  The study group believes that 
passengers will have confidence in a visible system. This SDVF is categorical in that the 
system either is visible or not.  A visible system receives a value of 1.0.  A system that is 
not visible receives a value of 0.0.  The Visible System SDVF is provided in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: Visible System SDVF 
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3.2.3.2 Distance SDVF 
 
 It is preferred to have a system that will not require the passengers to move their 
bags at all after checking them in at the airline ticket counter.   A system that requires 
passengers to move their bags 100 feet or more receives a value of 0.0.  The Distance 
SDVF in Figure 12 gives a value of 1.0 for a system that does not require passengers to 
move their bags after tagging at the check out counter.  A distance between 0 and 100 
feet linearly decreases in value.     
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Figure 12: Distance SDVF 
3.2.3.3 Number of Times SDVF  
 
 The Number of Times SDVF is used to assign a value based on how many 
different locations the passengers have to take their bags after tagging until they turn over 
the custody of the bags to the screeners or airlines.  Having to move bags a number of 
different times between security stations is considered an inconvenience as was the 
distance required to move the bags.  Not handling the bags at all after tagging receives a 
value of 1.0. Handling them once receives a value of 0.5 and handling them more than 
once receives a value of 0.0.  The Number of Times SDVF is provided in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13: Times Handled SDVF 
3.2.3.4 Minutes in Line SDVF 
 
 The Minutes in Line SDVF is used to determine a value for the time passengers 
wait while their bags are being screened before leaving them in the custody of the 
screeners.    While the group felt passengers do understand and appreciate the need for 
security, their patience is not unlimited.  Not waiting with the bags at all is the most 
preferred and receives a value of 1.0.  For each minute the passenger waits the value 
decreases linearly up to 15 minutes or more when the value is 0.0. 
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Figure 14: Time in Line SDVF 
3.2.4 Efficient Branch 
The group desires a system with minimal impact to their staff while 
accommodating for the various peak passenger flows. It is important that the checked 
baggage system does not have bottlenecks or delays to the bag processing.  Floor space is 
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a limited resource that has become even more limited since the implementation of the 
temporary checked baggage system.  The screening machines are large; the machines and 
queues take up this valuable floor space.  In addition to the floor space, the delivery 
method for the bags is an important issue for the airlines.  The airlines value independent 
make up rooms where the cleared bags are delivered.  This allows the airlines to load 
bags without the need to sort through bags traveling with other airlines.   Figure 15 
illustrates the sub-objectives that comprise the Efficient branch of the checked baggage 
system hierarchy.   
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Figure 15: Efficient Branch 
 
The definitions of the sub-objectives within this branch are provided in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Efficient Sub-objective Definitions 
Efficient Productive baggage system with minimal wasted 
baggage flow, manpower, and space. 
   Flow Throughput of the baggage with emphasis to avoid 
congestion, bottlenecks, and interruption 
   Manpower Personnel fluctuations necessary to accommodate the 
varying passenger load 
   Space Floor space of the airport required for the system  
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There are four measures used for the Efficient branch tier sub-objectives.  These 
measures are shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Efficient Branch with Measures 
 
Table 5: Definitions of Efficient Measures 
Measure Definition 
Delivery time (minutes) The time the checked bag takes to get to 
the make up room once it has been tag at 
the airline desk and sent to be screened. 
Delivery Method The level of sorting provided to the 
Airlines when delivered to a Make up 
room.  
Personnel Fluctuation The change in number of operators 
required to operate the baggage screening  
system 
Floor Space 
(Square Feet)  
The amount of floor space required from 
the airport for the operation of the checked 
baggage system. 
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3.2.5 Efficient Branch SDVFs  
The Efficient branch consists of four measures; Single Dimensional Value 
Functions were developed for each by the study group.  A brief description of each value 
function is provided separately. 
3.2.5.1 Delivery Time SDVF 
 
The Delivery Time SDVF is one of the two value functions used for the flow sub-
objective.  A system that can process bags from the point of being tagged to their arrival 
at the make up room in seven minutes or less receives a value of 1.0.  A system that 
processes bags in 15 minutes or more receives a value of 0.0.  The value for the time in 
between decreases linearly.  Fast delivery times are necessary to ensure enough time to 
load bags without adversely affecting airlines departure times.  This relationship is 
illustrated in the Delivery Time SDVF in Figure 17.  (It should be noted that the 
maximum time will be airport dependent.  Fifteen minutes was the desired maximum 
time for Dayton International Airport.) 
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Figure 17: Delivery Time SDVF 
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3.2.5.2 Delivery Method SDVF 
 
The Delivery Method SDVF assigns a value based on how a system delivers bags 
to the airline make up rooms.  The most preferred method is for the system to deliver 
bags to individual airline make up rooms.  This method receives a value of 1.0.  The least 
preferred method is for the system to deliver bags to a common make up room for 
multiple airlines that requires airline baggage handlers to sort bags.  That method receives 
a value of 0.0.  The second most preferred method is for the system to deliver bags to a 
common make up room but which sorts the bags according to airline.  This method 
receives a value of 0.8.  This function is illustrated in Figure 18.   
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Figure 18: Delivery Method SDVF 
 
3.2.5.3 Fluctuation of Personnel SDVF 
 
The Fluctuation of Personnel SDVF captures a value based on the amount of 
personnel changes necessary to accommodate varying passenger loads.  A system that 
requires a constant number of Personnel is the most preferred and receives a value of 1.0.  
A system that requires minor fluctuations in personnel levels is the second most 
preferred, receiving a value of 0.8.  Minor fluctuations are variations of ten percent or 
less.  A system that requires major fluctuation in personnel is the least preferred and 
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receives a value of 0.0.  Major fluctuations are personnel variations of more than 10 
percent. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Fluctuation of Personnel SDVF 
 
3.2.5.4 Floor Space SDVF 
 
The Floor Space SDVF provides a value based on the amount of terminal floor 
space required to support the system.  It is most preferred to have a system that requires 
no terminal floor space, such a system would receive a value of 1.0.  The second most 
preferred system would take up no more floor space than currently available to conduct 
baggage screening in the lobby area without changing the existing floor layout.  That 
system would receive a value of 0.5.  The least preferred system would require more 
floor space than is currently used and that system would receive a value of 0.0.  This 
relationship is illustrated in Figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Floor Space SDVF 
3.2.6 Security Branch 
The vulnerability of the screening system is an important objective since a system 
that is compromised forces manual bag clearing and thus severely impacts passenger 
process times.  In addition to the vulnerability, the capabilities of the equipment used for 
the system are important.  The capabilities of the equipment must meet minimum 
standards prior to being certified by the FAA, however.  There are different 
manufacturers of equipment.  The study group wants to ensure that the Dayton 
International Airport uses equipment with the highest level of capabilities.   These 
capabilities include the equipment’s performance detecting known explosives, average 
processing times, and maintenance performance based on fielded explosive systems in 
operation.  The Security sub-objectives as defined by the study group are illustrated in 
Figure 21.   
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Figure 21: Security Branch 
 The sub-objectives for the Security branch were defined based on the study 
group’s interpretation of what is important with respect to Security.  These definitions are 
given in Table 6. 
Table 6: Security Sub-objective Definitions 
Security Measures to prevent harm to passengers, personnel, and 
resources supporting the checked baggage system 
   Equipment Vulnerability The accessibility of the system to those who intend 
harm.  
   Equipment Capability The ability of the screening system to detect explosives, 
speed of processing bags, and reliability that the system 
will be available. 
   Isolation Capability The ability of the checked baggage system to separate a 
bag from the baggage flow so as not to impede bag 
processing. 
   Alarm Resolution Ability of the EDS machines integrated into the checked 
baggage system to assist operators in determining 
whether alerts of threat by screening machines are an 
actual or false threat. 
 
 
There are five lowest tier objectives for the Security branch.  The Security branch of the 
value hierarchy, with measures, is provided in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22: Security Branch with Measures 
The definitions of the measures for each of the Security Branch sub-objectives are 
provided in Table 7.  
Table 7: Definitions of Security Measures 
Measure Definition 
Public Access Can the passengers access the system 
without the need for identification? 
Catch Rate Percentage of known threats identified 
correctly 
False Alarm Rate The percentage of non threats incorrectly 
identified as threats 
Isolation Capable Is the system capable of sending a bag 
identified with a possible explosive to an 
area that will not impede processing of 
other bags? 
Online Performance How many alarms can be resolved by the 
checked baggage system without the need 
to manual clear the bags? 
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3.2.7 Security Branch SDVFs 
 
 There are five Single Dimensional Value Functions that were developed for the 
security branch.   
 
3.2.7.1 Public Access SDVF 
 
 After discussing the issue, the group concluded that it is preferable that the system 
not be accessible by the public.  Specifically a system inside of the Security Identification 
Display Area (SIDA) is the most preferred.  The SIDA is an area of the airport that 
requires cleared airport personnel and is therefore not accessible to the pubic. By securing 
the baggage screening equipment in the SIDA, the machines are protected from 
unauthorized tampering and the public has less exposure to unscreened bags.  A system 
that is not accessible to the Pubic receives a value of 1.0.  A system that is accessible to 
the public receives a value of 0.0. The Public Access SDVF is provided in Figure 23.   
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Figure 23: Public Access SDVF 
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3.2.7.2 Catch Rate SDVF 
 
 The Catch Rate SDVF converts a high score for a system that maximizes the 
percentage of known threats that are identified correctly.  Operational data could be 
gathered for this measure based on how different explosive detection equipment performs 
from Red Team inspections.  Red Team inspections are periodic inspections performed 
by the government to evaluate the effectiveness of the screening machines and operators 
at detecting bags with actual threats.  By collecting this data, a proxy is developed for the 
machine catch rate.  If the data were to show different types of equipment had differing 
average catch rates in various operational settings, the data may help identify potential 
improvements.  The minimal acceptable catch rate is prescribed by TSA.  Any catch rate 
higher than the required minimum would gain value on this exponential SDVF. 
Value
% Gap Closed between Min and Max
1
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Figure 24: Catch Rate SDVF 
 
Table 8: Data for Catch Rate SDVF 
Percent of the Gap between Minimum Catch Rate 
(Certified by FAA) and 100 Percent 
Value 
0 0.00 
50 0.66 
100 1.00 
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3.2.7.3 False Alarm Rate SDVF 
 
The False Alarm Rate SDVF uses the percentage of items incorrectly identified as 
threats to define a value for equipment capability.  A false alarm rate of 0 has a value of 
1.0.  As the percentage of false alarms approaches 100 percent the value decreases 
exponentially as illustrated in Figure 25.  As with the Catch Rate SDVF, operational data 
should be used for this measure if made available by the government.    
Value
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Figure 25: False Alarm Rate SDVF 
Table 9: Data for False Alarm Rate SDVF 
False Alarm (Percent) Value 
0 1.00 
25 0.25 
100 0.00 
 
 
3.2.7.4 Isolation Capable SDVF 
  
 It is preferred for a baggage screening system to be capable of isolating bags that 
are identified as a threat.  This isolation capability allows the bag to received additional 
screening while allowing other bags to continue in the system without being hindered.  A 
system that is capable of isolating bags receives a value of 1.0 and a system that does not 
have isolation capability receives a value of 0.0.  The Isolation Capable SDVF is 
provided in Figure 26.   
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Figure 26: Isolation Capable SDVF 
 
3.2.7.5 Online Performance SDVF 
 
   The Online Performance SDVF uses the percent of alarms that can be resolved 
within the screening machines to define a value for alarm resolution.  The higher the 
percentage of alarms handled within the machines without requiring hand searches the 
better. The Online Performance SDVF is provided in Figure 27 and the data points used 
to generate this Figure is provided in Table 10. 
Value
Online Performance Resolution (Percent)
1
0
0. 100.  
Figure 27: Online Performances SDVF 
Table 10: Data Points for Online Performance SDVF 
% of Alarms 
Resolved within EDS 
Value 
0 0.0 
15 0.10 
30 0.50 
60 0.90 
100 1.00 
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3.2.8 Ease of Operation Branch 
The Ease of Operation objective is the fourth fundamental objective in the 
hierarchy.  There are four lowest tier objectives for the Ease of Operation branch.  The 
Ease of Operation branch is provided in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28: Ease of Operation Branch 
 
The definitions for each of these sub-objectives as defined by the study team are 
provided in Table 8. 
Table 11: Ease of Operation Sub-objective Definitions 
Ease of Operation The safety and comfort for the operators of the 
baggage screening system along with the 
maintainability, availability, and reliability. 
   Safety Application of engineering and management 
principles, criteria, and techniques to avoid harm to 
operators of the system. 
   Comfort Condition or feeling of pleasurable ease, well-being, 
and contentment. 
   Maintainability / Availability The probability that a failed system will be repaired  
   Reliability The probability that the system will perform as 
required when operated within its operational limits 
 
Four measures were developed to correspond to the lowest tier sub-objectives for the 
Ease of Operation branch.  This branch, with measures, is provided in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29: Ease of Operation Branch with Measures 
The definitions of these measures defined by the study group are provided in Table 12.   
 
Table 12: Definitions of Ease of Operation Measures 
Measure Definition 
# Features above Minimum Required, Safety Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) minimum 
safety features 
# Features above Minimum Required, Comfort Additional features included to system 
such as cushioned chairs, fans, etc. 
Average Repair Time The time in hours that repairs on the 
system take  
Number of Breakdowns The number of breakdown in addition 
to the normally scheduled maintenance 
downtime 
 
 
3.2.9 Ease of Operation SDVFs 
The Ease of Operation Branch consists of four measures; Single Dimensional 
Value Functions for the each by the study group.  A brief description of each value 
function is provided separately.  
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3.2.9.1 Number of Safety Features SDVF 
  
It is desirable to have a checked baggage system with safety features over and 
above the required features.  The TSA and OSHA stipulate required safety features.  
These required features would serve as the minimum.  While clearly valued, these items 
would receive a score of zero on the measure as it captures additional features.  Such 
features can take any form.  For example this could include items such as conveyor shut 
down switches that isolate portions of the baggage systems while allowing other parts of 
the conveyor to continue operating.  This SDVF is categorical, scoring value for each 
item above the required minimum features.  The increase SDVF is in Figure 30 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 or more
# of Safety Features
Va
lu
e
 
Figure 30: Number of Safety Features SDVF 
 
3.2.9.2 Number of Comfort Features SDVF 
 
It is desirable to have a checked baggage system with comfort features over and 
above the minimum.  The required comfort features stipulated by TSA would serve as the 
minimum.  While clearly valued, these items would receive a score of zero on this 
measure items as it captures additional features.  Such features can take any form.  For 
example this could include items such as screening system monitors with reduced glare to 
reduce eye strain and will lead to more attentive operators.  This SDVF is categorical, 
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scoring value for each item above the required minimum features.  The increase SDVF is 
in Figure 31  
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 1 2 3 4 5 or more
# of Comfort Features
Va
lu
e
 
Figure 31: Number of Comfort Features SDVF 
 
3.2.9.3 Time to Repair SDVF 
 
The study group believes it is desirable to have a system with the minimum 
average repair time.  In the case of unscheduled maintenance problems it is important to 
get the system back up in less than 1 hour in order to minimize the disruption to the 
passenger and bag flow.  A repair that takes more than 24 hours is considered 
unacceptable and would receive a value of 0.0.  This SDVF is categorical.  The most 
preferred repair time of 1 hour or less receives a value of 1.0 and as the repair takes 
longer the value decreases incrementally.  The Time to Repair SDVF is in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32: Time to Repair SDVF 
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3.2.9.4 Number of Breakdowns SDVF 
 
The Number of Breakdowns SDVF provides a value for the Reliability sub-
objective.  Based on the average number of system breakdowns that occur within a 
maintenance cycle a value is assigned.  The maintenance cycle is defined as 30 days.  A 
system that averages no breakdowns within the maintenance cycle receives a value of 
1.0.  As the average number of breakdowns increases the value given for the SDVF 
decreases.  A system with 3 or more breakdowns on average per month is considered 
unacceptable and receives a value of 0.0.  This SDVF is provided in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33: Number of Breakdowns SDVF 
 
3.2.10 Flexibility Branch 
The Flexibility objective is the fifth first tier sub-objective.  The Flexibility 
Branch consists of three sub-objectives.  The Flexibility Branch is expanded in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34: Flexibility Branch 
 
The definitions described by the study group for these Flexibility sub-objectives are 
provided in Table 10. 
Table 13: Flexibility Objective Definitions 
Flexibility The capability of adapting to new, different, or 
changing requirements 
   Robustness Holds up well under exceptional conditions 
   Expandable Capable of increasing the size of scope of the system 
in the future 
   Automation Operation or control of a process performed by 
equipment rather than manually   
 
 
There are six lowest tier objectives for the Flexibility branch.  This branch, with measures 
is provided in Figure 35.   
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Figure 35: Flexibility Branch With Measures 
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The definitions developed for the Flexibility sub-objective measures are provided in 
Table 11. 
Table 14: Flexibility Measure Definitions 
Measure Definition 
Conveyor Redundancies How many back up measures are available 
on the conveyor system in case of a 
conveyor breakdown? 
Detection Redundancies How many back up detection systems are 
available to screen bags identified as 
threats? 
Expandable Can the system be expanded to take a 
larger passenger load? 
Scanning Is the system capable of tracking bags with 
identification such as bar code? 
Routing / Divert Is the system capable of routing and 
diverting bags automatically? 
Sort to Airline Make Up How does the system sort the passenger 
bags to make up Areas?  
 
 
3.2.11.1 Conveyor Redundancy SDVF 
 
The Conveyor Redundancy SDVF is one of two value function for the Robustness 
sub-objective.  It is desirable for the checked baggage system to have redundant ability.  
The conveyor system may have to be shut down to perform maintenance or clear jammed 
bags. It is preferred to have a system that is capable of moving bags on alternate 
conveyor routes to avoid bag process delays or the requirement for the manual transfer of 
bags.  The most preferred realistic number of redundant conveyor system is 3 or more for 
the Dayton International Airport.  The least preferred option is for the checked baggage 
system to have no redundant conveyor systems.  This SDVF is provided in Figure 36  
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Figure 36: Conveyor Redundancy SDVF 
 
3.2.11.2 Detection Redundancy SDVF 
  
It is desirable to have a checked baggage systems that has multiple automated 
layers of detection abilities. The Detection Redundancy SDVF is the second value 
function used for the Robustness sub-objective.  It is used to assign a value based on the 
number of redundant detection capabilities built into the system.  A system that has 3 or 
more redundant detection features receives a value of 1.0.   
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Figure 37: Detection Redundancy SDVF 
 
3.2.11.3 Expandable SDVF 
 
 It is most preferred to have a checked baggage system that can be expanded to 
take on a larger passenger load accommodating any expansion in passenger loads and air 
carriers.  The Expandable SDVF assigns a value of 1.0 for a system that is able to 
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accommodate additional airlines should the airport expand the number of airlines.  This 
value function is provided in Figure 38. 
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Figure 38: Expandable SDVF 
 
 This next group of measures captures the value of various automated effects.  The 
highest value would be gained by an automated process for all three of these factors.  
However, the separate measures capture the ability to add certain of these automated 
functions separately from the others. 
 
3.2.11.4 Tracking SDVF 
 
 It is preferred to have a checked baggage system that is capable of tracking bags 
in the screening process and can tell where a checked bag is located.  The Tracking 
SDVF assigns a value of 1.0 for a system that automatically tracks checked bags and 
assigns a value of 0.0 for a system that is not capable of tracking automatically. This 
SDVF is provided in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39: Tracking SDVF 
 
3.2.11.5 Routing / Divert SDVF 
 
 The study group prefers a checked baggage system is capable of automatically 
routing and diverting bags.  Such automated handling reduces personnel needs and, when 
properly implemented, provides better service than manual handling. 
 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
No Yes
Route Divert Capable
Va
lu
e
 
Figure 40: Routing Divert SDVF 
 
3.2.11.6 Sorting SDVF 
 
 The Sorting SDVF is the third value function for the Automation sub-objective.  It 
used to assign a value of 1.0 for a system that is capable of automatically sorting bags to 
airline make up rooms.  
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Figure 41: Sorting SDVF 
 
 The Checked Baggage System Hierarchy includes 23 measures used to assess 
how well potential 100 percent checked baggage system alternatives provide what was 
deemed important by the study group.  Several of these measures will require data that 
was not available to the study group at the time.  However these were deemed important 
enough to be included.   
 
3.3.1 Decompose Cost 
 The study group identified three areas of concern for cost.  These areas were 
identified during the affinity diagram process used to define the objectives for the 
checked baggage system hierarchy. The cost areas were developed into three sub-
objectives.  The first is the cost associated with the Personnel required to operate the 
system.  The second sub-objective is the cost associated with the type of construction 
required to support the checked baggage system.  The third is the cost from acquisitions 
to support the checked baggage system such as a conveyor system used to move and 
transfer bags through screening machines.  The definitions for these sub-objectives are 
provided in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Cost Objective Definitions 
Cost Expenditure of time, money, and resources to  
   People The personnel necessary to operate the system 
   Infrastructure The level of construction necessary to install the 
system.   
   Acquisition The purchases made for a system which includes 
conveyor systems, display monitors.   
 
The cost hierarchy with measures is provided in Figure 42. 
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Figure 42: Cost Hierarchy with Measures 
The definitions of these measures as defined by the study group are listed in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Cost Objective Definitions 
Measure Definition 
# of People The number of operators required to run 
and maintain the system. 
Level of Work Type of construction required to support 
the new system. 
Cost of System The net present value of the system over its 
anticipated lifecycle. 
 
3.3.2.1 Personnel SDVF 
 
 The Personnel SDVF uses the number of operators required for the system per 
shift to define a value for personnel.  The most preferred number of operators is 3 which 
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receives a value of 1.0.  The least preferred is 10 or more operators which receives a 
value of 0.  The value decreases linearly as the number of operators increases from 3 to 
10. 
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Figure 43: Personnel SDVF 
 
3.3.2.2 Level of Construction SDVF 
 
 The Level of Construction SDVF is used to obtain a value for the amount of 
construction necessary to install the checked baggage screening system.  A system that 
can be installed without construction to the facility is most preferred and receives a value 
of 1.0.  A system that requires minor work includes work such as the movement of non-
load bearing walls and renovations within the existing footprint of the facilities receives a 
value of 0.5.   A system that requires major work includes such work as the movement of 
load bearing walls, reinforcement of floor to increase loading capability, and renovations 
that expand the existing footprint of the facilities receives a value of 0.0.  
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Figure 44: Level of Infrastructure SDVF 
 
3.3.2.3 Acquisition SDVF 
  
 The Acquisition SDVF is used to assign a value based on the net present value 
(NPV) of conveyor systems, facility modifications, and construction to support the 
system.  Note that this cost is exclusive of the cost of the EDS machines.  These 
machines are not currently a cost incurred by the Dayton International Airport.  A system 
that will not incur any cost to the Airport for these items is the most preferred and 
receives a value of 1.0.  A system that requires 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) or more is the 
least preferred and receives a value of 0.0.  As the cost for these items moves from zero 
dollars to 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) the value decreases linearly.  This SDVF is 
illustrated in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45: Acquisition SDVF 
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3.4 Step 5: Weight the Hierarchy 
 The hierarchies consist of several different objectives which are not of equal 
importance.  It is necessary to weight the hierarchy from the decision maker’s 
perspective. The direct weight method, discussed in Chapter 2, was used to weight the 
hierarchy.  The weighting for the hierarchy was performed by two members of the 
Director of Aviations staff.  Both were members of the study team and were familiar with 
the hierarchies, measures, and value functions already defined.  
 3.4.1 Weights for 100 percent checked baggage system 
The weights were elicited using the direct weighting method.  Weights were 
assigned locally within each branch of the hierarchy.  The 100 percent checked baggage 
system hierarchy is provided in Figure 46.  Starting with the lowest tier of the hierarchy, 
which are the measures, each measure was weighted based on its relative importance to 
the other measures used for the same sub-objective. If only one measure was used for a 
sub-objective it received 100 percent of the weight (100 marbles).  If a sub-objective had 
more than one measure, for example two measures, the decision makers compared the 
importance one measure in terms of the other.  If one measure was determined to be 
twice as important as the other then the more important measure would receive 66 
marbles while the less important measure would receive 33 marbles.  Weights were 
assigned locally beginning with the Passenger Impact Branch moving to the right for the 
remaining four branches.  Weights for the Passenger Impact Branch are provided in 
Figure 46.  After weights were assigned within each Branch the Branches, first tier 
objectives of the overall hierarchy were given weights using the same 100 marble direct 
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weight method.   The weight assigned to the other four branches of the 100 percent 
checked baggage hierarchy are provided in Appendix A.   
 3.4.1 Weight Checked Baggage System Hierarchy Local 
 There are a total of 23 measures for the Checked Baggage System Hierarchy.  
These measures, displayed below their corresponding sub-objectives, are used to attain 
how well an alternative meets the objectives defined in the hierarchy.  The decision 
maker provided weights within each branch.  Therefore the weights the decision makers 
assigned to the measures represent the importance of the measures within each branch of 
the hierarchy.  These weights for the lowest tier of each branch sums to 1.0.   
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Figure 46: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy 
and Passenger Impact Branch Local Weights 
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3.4.2 Weight Checked Baggage System Hierarchy Global 
 
The global weight for each measure is calculated by multiplying the local weight 
given to the sub-objectives and weight of each objective located above that measure until 
the fundamental objective is reached.  The global weights for the 23 measures in the 100 
Percent Checked Baggage System Hierarchy must sum to one.  These weights represent 
the importance that each measure has to the fundamental objective as assigned by the 
decision maker.  The 100 Percent Checked Baggage System Hierarchy global weights are 
provided in Figure 47.   
 
100 Percent
Checked Baggage
System
Ease of
OperationEfficient Security
Passenger
Impact Flexibility
.25.13 .20.25 .17
 
Figure 47: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy First Tier Weights 
 
The Passenger Impact and Flexibility tier objectives received 0.25 of the weight 
each.  They were deemed the most important to the Director of Aviation.  The Ease of 
Operation objective was given a weight of 0.20. The Efficient objective was given a 
weight of 0.17.  The Security objective was given a weight of 0.13.  Security was given 
the least weight but this is not because security is not important.  The security objectives 
provide value to capabilities above and beyond the minimum accepted criteria of the 
FAA and TSA.  These minimum accepted standards are considered stringent.  Therefore 
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the other objectives were given more weight.  The Passenger Impact and Flexibility 
objectives were given the most weight because they were seen as the most important to 
the passengers and the ability to accommodate various passenger loads.  The Ease of 
Operation objective was given more weight than the Efficient objective because the 
standards for the workers were deemed as more important than the Efficient objectives. 
 
3.4.3 Weights for Cost 
 The direct weighting method was also used to weight the cost hierarchy.  Since 
this hierarchy is small in size, (only includes three measures), both the local and global 
weights are provided in Figure 48.   
Cost
AcquisitionPeople Infrastructure
Personnel Level ofWork
NPV of
system
1.0 1.0 1.0
.15 .60 .25
 
Figure 48: Cost Hierarchy with Weights 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter covered in detail the creation of a value hierarchy for a 100 percent 
checked baggage system from the perspective of the Director of Aviation at Dayton 
International Airport.  This is coupled with a “cost hierarchy” which captures the cost of 
67 
such a system.  The characteristics valued by the stakeholders also provide guidance to 
system designers.  These values clearly delineate design preferences of the stakeholders.  
The model is now available to the Dayton International Airport, or any other airport that 
wishes to adopt it.  Chapter 4, using a notional example, illustrates how alternatives may 
be analyzed once they are developed.   
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Chapter 4.  Data Collection & Analysis of Results 
 The 100 percent checked baggage and cost hierarchies developed during the 
previous five steps were done so through a series of five group meetings with the 
integrated study team.  The minutes from all group meetings are provided in Appendix B.  
During a sixth meeting, the Dayton International Airport team members discussed 
alternatives to use to illustrate the validity of using these hierarchies to evaluate and 
compare potential checked baggage system hierarchy.  Dayton International Airport has 
an interim system in place that met the requirement for 100 percent screening of checked 
baggage.  The study group is interested in maximizing the value obtained in a checked 
baggage system.  Therefore the group desired to use the current system as one alternative.  
The group provided several of their desired preferences throughout the model 
development process.  These preferences were used to develop a notional example to 
provide a comparison. 
4.1 Step 6 Alternative Generation 
 
 At this point of the VFT process, alternatives are generated with the intent of 
meeting the objectives defined in the two hierarchies.  Several alternatives should be used 
to provide comparison for how each meets the objectives formed in the hierarchies. For 
this research two notional alternatives were used for illustrative purposes, the current 
Terminal floor system and a Hypothetical Inline system. The Terminal floor system, 
along with this notional Inline system, was used to demonstrate the concepts for the 
baggage system and cost hierarchies.  The notional alternative is an inline system which 
is integrated into a baggage handling conveyor system.   
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4.1.1 Terminal Floor System – Interim as of 31 December 2002 
 
 This interim system consists of the placement of EDS and Explosive Trace 
Detection machines in the airport lobby directly in front of the airline ticket check in 
counters.  This was used to meet the mandate for 100 percent screening.  This system did 
not require facility modifications or construction.   
4.1.2 Hypothetical System, (Inline System) 
 
 The Hypothetical System alternative is roughly based on the preferences gathered 
from the study group meetings.  This is an inline system integrated into a baggage 
handling system.  This system allows passengers to leave their checked bags in the 
custody of the Airlines after check-in.  The bags are then transferred through the 
explosive screening machines and process via a conveyor system directly to the airline 
make up rooms.  Again, it should be noted that this is a hypothetical system, whose 
scores are notional. 
4.2 Step 7 Alternative Scoring 
 Scoring of the alternatives is typically performed by first gathering data needed 
for each of the hierarchy measures defined for the lowest tier objectives.  This may 
involve historic data, operational parameters or expert opinion.  The single dimensional 
value functions are then used to obtain a value score of each measure.  
4.2.1 Checked Baggage System  
The notional data used in this illustration for both the current system and 
hypothetical system are provided in Table 17.  
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Table 17: Checked Baggage System Hierarchy Notional Data 
Branch Measure Title Terminal Floor 
System 
Inline System 
Passenger Impact    
 Visible System Yes Yes 
 Distance 30 ft 0 ft 
 # of Times 1 0 
 Minutes in Line 7 minutes 0 minutes 
Efficient    
 Delivery Time 10 10 
 
Delivery Method 
separate make up 
room by airline 
separate make up 
room by airline 
 Personnel 
Fluctuation minor none 
 Floor Space Same Less 
Security    
 Public Access Yes No 
 Catch Rate 0 0 
 False Alarm Rate 0 0 
 Isolation Capable No Yes 
 Online Performance 0 0 
Ease of Operation    
 OSHA Features 1 1 
 Comfort Features 1 1 
 Average Repair 
Time Less than 1 hour Less than 1 hour 
 Number 
breakdowns 0 0 
Flexibility    
 Conveyor 
Redundancies 0 1 
 Detection 
Redundancies 1 1 
 Expandable Yes Yes 
 Scanning No Yes 
 Routing No Yes 
 Sort to Airline No Yes 
4.2.2 Cost Hierarchy 
The notional cost data used for the measures in the cost hierarchy for both the 
Terminal Floor System and Hypothetical system alternatives are provided in Table 15.  
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The number of personnel data was provided from the study group based their experience 
with the current system operation as well as that expected from an inline system that is 
integrated into an automated baggage handling system.  The current system required no 
work on the airport infrastructure.  The hypothetical system would require significant 
work on the infrastructure due to the fact that there is not enough room behind the airline 
ticket counter for an inline system.  The current system required no acquisition costs.  
The study group estimated, based on their experience, that the inline system would 
require approximately $1.5M in acquisition for a conveyor system.  A summary of this 
notional data is provided in Table 18. 
 
Table 18: Cost Hierarchy Notional Data 
Branch Measure Title Terminal Floor 
System 
Inline System 
Personnel    
 Number of 
Personnel 
8 3 
Infrastructure    
 Level of Work None Major 
Acquisition    
 NPV for System $0 $1.5M 
 
4.3 Step 8 Deterministic Analysis 
 Deterministic Analysis uses the additive value function to obtain an overall score 
for each alternative.   The global weights assigned by the decision maker for each of the 
measures are multiplied by the value obtained from the measures’ SDVF.  These 
calculations were carried out using the Logical Decisions for Windows Version 5.114 
software.  The Dayton International Airport model had previously been set-up in the 
Logical Decisions software as the earlier steps were completed. 
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4.3.1 Checked Baggage System Hierarchy 
The checked baggage system hierarchy included 23 measures.  The additive value 
function obtains an overall score for an alternative by adding the global weight for each 
measure multiplied by the value obtained by that measures value function.  The best 
possible score for an alternative is 1.0. The scores for each alternative are provided in 
Figure 49.  This figure also provides a visual display for each of the five branches within 
the hierarchy.      
Alternative
Max Attainable Score Alternative
Hypothetical System (Inline System)
Terminal Floor System
Score
1.000
0.815
0.558
Passenger Impact
Efficient
Flexibility
Security
Ease of Operation
 
Figure 49: Alternative Rankings for Checked Baggage System Hierarchy 
 
The notional Inline System clearly scored higher than the Terminal Floor System 
for four of the branches in this example.  The two alternatives received the same score for 
the Ease of Operation branch as both used the same assumptions.  With the same 
illustrative data used; their scores were expected to be the same.  The software allows 
comparison charts such as in Figure 49 to be developed for any tier or branch tier of the 
hierarchy. 
4.3.2 Cost Hierarchy 
 The cost hierarchy included 3 measures.  The notional scores for each alternative 
for cost are provided in Figure 50.  This figure also provides a breakout for each of the 
three objectives of the hierarchy. 
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COST
Alternative
Max Attainable Score
T erminal Floor System
Inline system
Score
1.000
0.875
0.150
Infrastructure Acquisit ion Personnel  
Figure 50: Alternative Rankings for Cost Hierarchy 
 
The Terminal Floor System scored better for both the Infrastructure and 
Acquisition objectives.  The Hypothetical System scored better for the Personnel 
objective. Overall, the Terminal Floor System is preferred on the cost hierarchy.   
4.3.3 Cost / Benefit Comparison 
 The most preferred checked baggage system would score a 1.0 for both the 
checked baggage system hierarchy and the cost hierarchy.  However, it is unlikely an 
alternative could capture a maximum score of 1.0 from both hierarchies.  A system that 
scores high for the checked baggage system hierarchy may be more costly, perhaps 
requiring construction or higher acquisition costs.  Figure 51 illustrates the tradeoffs 
involved between the benefit and cost.   
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Figure 51: Cost Benefit Plot 
 
  The cost and benefit scores for both of the notional alternatives have been plotted 
in Figure 51.  The Inline System scored very low on cost (0.150) while achieving a high 
benefit score (0.815) (It should be noted that a low cost score is undesirable.).  An 
alternative such as the Inline System achieves a good score for the checked baggage 
hierarchy because it is automated, manpower efficient, and provides a high level of 
customer convenience.  However it will require acquisition and infrastructure 
modifications costs which causes it to receive a lower score for cost.  The Terminal Floor 
System receives higher marks in the opposite manner, high score for cost and a low score 
for benefit.  Additionally alternatives could be evaluated in this manner to provide a 
means of differentiating between systems that score relatively the same for the benefit but 
receive different cost scores.  The ultimate decision makers will need to determine their 
preferences or trade-off between these costs and benefits. 
4.4 Step 9 Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity Analysis was performed on each of the first tier objectives to illustrate 
weight sensitivity.  Questions often arise on the weighting.  The one way sensitivity 
75 
analysis changes the weight of one objective while holding the proportion of the weights 
among the remaining objectives.  If the choice is insensitive to a weight change, 
discussion of the weight is usually curtailed.  If the choice is sensitive to the weights, this 
suggests careful study of the weight.   
4.4.1 Checked Baggage System Hierarchy 
Sensitivity analysis determined that in this simple illustrative example, the 
Hypothetical System was dominant for each objective.  An example of sensitivity 
analysis performed on the Passenger Impact objective illustrates this finding in Figure 52.  
The decision maker gave Passenger Impact a weight of 0.25.  Regardless of the weight 
assigned to Passenger Impact, the value for the Inline System is the higher of the two 
alternatives.  The same held true for the other measures.  Again, such analysis can be 
carried out at any tier of the hierarchy. 
Value
Percent of Weight on Passenger Im pact Goal
Best
Worst
0 100
Inline system
Interim Sy stem - Current
5025
 
Figure 52: Passenger Impact Branch Sensitivity Analysis 
4.4.2 Cost Hierarchy 
Sensitivity analysis determined that that two of the three cost sub-objectives were 
insensitive to weight changes.  Regardless of the change in weight for either the 
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Infrastructure or Acquisition objectives, the Terminal Floor System has the highest score.  
It was shown that the Personnel objective was sensitive to the change in weight.  As 
shown in Figure 53, if there were questions on the Personnel weight, the decision will not 
change until the weight increases from its present value of 15% to 55% or higher.  This 
would indicate insensitivity to the personnel weight, suggesting that short of a complete 
re-weighting, the Terminal Floor System will remain the preferred choice on cost (but not 
benefit). 
 
Score
Percent of Weight
Best
Worst
0 100
Max Attainable Score
Terminal Floor System
Hypothetical System (Inline system)
15 55
Personnel
 
Figure 53: Personnel Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Sensitivity Analysis was performed on each first tier objective of both hierarchies.  
The Analysis using the notional alternatives illustrated that the Hypothetical Inline 
System was insensitive to weights.  Therefore regardless of the weighting used to weight 
the Checked Baggage System Hierarchy the rankings would not change.  A similar 
conclusion can be drawn for the Sensitivity Analysis performed on the Cost Hierarchy 
except for the Terminal System alternative.  The weights would have to be dramatically 
changed in order to change the alternative ranking for the Cost Hierarchy.  Such an 
analysis helps focus where more detailed discussion of the weights may be required.  In 
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the small, notional example, the decisions on benefit and cost are insensitive to the 
weighting.   
78 
 
Chapter 5. Findings & Conclusions 
5.1 Overview 
 
 The Dayton International Airport, along with the rest of the commercial airports 
in the nation, was mandated to implement 100 percent screening of checked baggage with 
explosive detection systems by 31 December 2002.  Prior to this mandate, the FAA goal 
for 100 percent checked baggage screening was 2009.  A longer design process, with the 
involvement of the airport stakeholders, would be desirable to design and implement a 
solution that would best meet the security requirements while maximizing efficiency and 
minimizing any negative impacts to the stakeholders.  The time was not available before 
implementing an interim solution. With the security requirements mitigated, Dayton 
International Airport has the time to evaluate potential long term solutions for a 100 
percent checked baggage system.  Value Focused Thinking was used to develop a value 
model to assist in the evaluation of potential checked baggage system alternatives.  This 
methodology enabled the study group consisting of Dayton International Airport 
stakeholders to create a value model with the objectives they found to be most important 
for a 100 percent checked baggage system.  The model developed will allow the airport 
to make decisions based on these objectives.   
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5.2 Value Model Strengths 
 The value hierarchy developed in this study was created by eliciting critical 
objectives of the Dayton International Airport stakeholders.   The integrated study team, 
consisting of five key stakeholders from the Airport Operations Staff, Airlines, and TSA 
met on six different occasions as a group to develop 23 measures and value functions for 
a Checked Baggage System Hierarchy.  The study team also developed 3 measures and 
value functions for a Cost Hierarchy.  These stakeholders provided their valuable insight 
and expertise and ultimately spent more than 150 man-hours to complete the 
development of this model.    This hierarchy can be used to assist the Dayton 
International Airport stakeholders in making a better informed and defendable decision 
that could ultimately lead to higher levels of efficiency and passenger convenience then 
currently provided by the airport’s checked baggage system. 
 This is the first documented use of VFT to assist airports in the selection of 
potential long term solutions for 100 percent checked baggage systems.      
5.3 Value Model Weaknesses 
 The value model requires some data not available during this research for to 
provide a more meaningful comparison of potential alternatives.  These three measures 
do, however, suggest future data requirements for the TSA and others to consider.  The 
study did not compare real world alternatives.  The value functions used in this study 
were developed with deterministic or point estimates for the measure scores.  These point 
estimates do not take into account the uncertainty and risk involved in decision making.    
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5.4 Conclusion 
 The research has shown that a value model could be developed to aid Dayton 
International Airport in evaluating potential long term solutions for a 100 percent 
checked baggage system. A hypothetical checked baggage system was developed that 
provided more value than the current checked baggage system in use at airport.  The 
study provides insight about the value of the current system including the identification 
of value gaps where the current system could be improved.        
5.5 Recommendations for Future Work 
Follow up research could be conducted with Dayton International Airport to 
gather data and incorporate it into the model’s measures and value functions.  A model 
with complete data could provide additional insight into how to select the best 100 
percent checked baggage system.   The value model could be used to tailor requests for 
bid proposals to provide design packages for a checked baggage system.  This decision 
aid could be modified and used as a decision aid for stakeholders from other airports 
within the United States faced with the same problem.  
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Appendix A: Local Weights by Branch 
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Figure A  1: Efficient Branch with Local Weights 
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Figure A  2: Security Branch with Local Weights 
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Figure A  3: Ease of Operation Branch with Local Weights 
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Figure A  4: Flexibility Branch with Local Weights 
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Appendix B: Integrated Study Team Minutes 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)  
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS  
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY  
 
INITIAL MEETING MINUTES 10 DEC 2002 
 
TIME: 0900-1030 
 
PLACE: Dayton International Airport Operations, 5th Floor Conference Room 
 
ATTENDEES: 
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT 
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT 
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT 
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations 
Mr. Doug Warner, Dayton International Airport, Facilities 
Mr. Dave Mason, Dayton International Airport, Chief Engineer 
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. Bob Hall, Continental Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer 
Mr. Jerry Witt, TSA, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. Ray Muench, UNISYS, IT Engineer 
 
PURPOSE:  
Introduce Value Focused Thinking (VFT), a decision analysis methodology and an 
application of VFT for Dayton International Airport’s long term solution for a 100% 
checked baggage system.  Appoint team members from interested stakeholders for an 
integrated study team (IST).    Set first meeting for IST to begin work on a value 
hierarchy.  
 
OPENING DISCUSION:  
All attendees introduced themselves.  Dr. Deckro provided an overview briefing on the 
VFT methodology.  Capt Chambal discussed real world applications of VFT for a 
classified information system at the Air Force Technical Applications Center and the Air 
Force Force Protection Battlelab.  Capt Meade introduced the focus of this study; Dayton 
International Airport’s checked baggage system.   
 
INTRODUCTION AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
 
All attendees were given an opportunity to ask questions about the VFT methodology and 
scope of the study for the Dayton International Airport’s baggage system. 
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Ronnie Wayne expressed concern about human factors, focus on passengers, and 
providing options to an in-line system.   Regardless of the system to be used there will be 
some level of human involvement.  An example would be an employee at the end of the 
baggage system that becomes ill and as a result is unable to keep the system from backing 
up.  The law requires the security measures but the airports are in place to serve the 
passengers (customers) and its imperative to keep them as satisfied as possible.  The 
study should include the perceptions of the passengers.  Additionally, the study shouldn’t 
be limited to that of an-line system but instead focus on the values important in a checked 
baggage system.   
 
Jerry Witt asked if the group from AFIT had clearances to view classified and sensitive 
documents.  Dr. Deckro stated that the AFIT members have security clearances at no less 
than the Secret level.  
 
Bob Hall pointed out that the literature review references presented on slide 23 of the 
briefing did not include Title 49 CFR parts 1540 and 1544. 
 
Youseff Elzein stated that this study should be complete prior to selecting the best layout 
for the checked baggage system.  Several consultants are available to prepare alternatives 
and two have already been prepared.   
 
Dave Mason stated that the timeline of the study and that of checked baggage system are 
separate.  The set up of the checked baggage system will not be dependant upon the 
completion of this study.  The results of the study can be used to aid in a long term 
solution of the airport’s checked baggage system.  
 
Ronnie Wayne asked about the possibility of one or more of the AFIT group to get a 
badge for unescorted access in the airport.  After some discussion as to the time it 
normally takes to complete the paperwork, Capt Meade agreed to get a badge. 
 
Members for the IST were appointed as follows:   
IST members:  
Capt Quincy Meade, Capt Stephen Chambal, Dick Deckro  AFIT 
John Thomas, David Meek     TSA 
Jon Vrabal, Youseff Elzein, Doug Warner   Dayton International Airport  
Bob Hall       Continental  
Ronnie Wayne      Delta 
 
OPEN ITEMS: 
 
The next meeting for the IST was not set at the meeting.  All parties generally agreed that 
the best times for a meeting would be Tuesdays to Thursdays.   Capt Meade is 
responsible for coordinating the next meeting date and time and will contact all parties.  
Capt Meade will arrange individual meetings with the IST members in advance of our 
first group meeting to be scheduled after 6 JAN 03. 
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)  
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS  
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY 
 
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #2, 14 JAN 03 
 
TIME: 1300-1600 
 
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Business Traveler Conference Room 
 
ATTENDEES: 
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT 
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT 
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT 
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations 
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer 
Mr. Dave Mason, Dayton International Airport, Chief Engineer 
Mr. Doug Warner, Dayton International Airport, Facilities 
Mr. Bob Hall, Continental Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
 
PURPOSE: 
Begin the development of the 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy.  Complete 
the first tier of the hierarchy and continue breaking down first tier objectives. 
 
OPENING DISCUSSION: 
The minutes of the previous meeting were discussed.  The research timeline was 
introduced with the following items.   
 
Develop and Verify Hierarchy  14 JAN 03 
Develop Measures    TBD 
Weight Hierarchy    TBD 
Score and Analyze Options   TBD 
 
Dates were not provided at the time in order to arrange for another group meeting time 
that will accommodate all the team members.  Wednesdays at 1pm appear to be the best 
time to meet as a complete group.   
 
A first tier example for a 100% checked baggage system was provided to begin group 
discussion.  The group then began building an affinity diagram to develop the value 
hierarchy. 
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
The first tier of the value hierarchy was developed by brainstorming the most important 
values to the group members.  Each member of the study group provided the objectives 
most important to them in a 100 percent checked baggage system.  Each item was 
recorded and then grouped into common headings using an Affinity diagram. These main 
headings became the first tier objectives.  These first tier objectives are:  
 Passenger Impact 
 Efficiency 
 Flexibility 
 Security  
 Reliability 
 Cost 
 
The Affinity Diagram inputs are as follows: 
 
FLEXIBILITY 
 
 Impact on airline staff 
 Work within the environment 
 Re-routing 
 Personnel 
 Location 
 Back up 
 Technology 
 Shut down procedures 
  For breaks and hits 
 Upgradeability 
 Expandability 
 Scalability 
  Operationally 
  
The following was discussed for the first tier objective, Flexibility. 
 
The impact on the airline staff is an issue.  It’s desirable to have a system that will not 
result in a requirement for airline personnel to handle problems associated with damaged, 
lost, or misrouted bags.   
 
The system must work within the environment.  The airport was designed and built prior 
to the requirement for the 100% checked baggage system.  Therefore it’s important that 
the long term solution is built in a manner that works within the Dayton airport facilities.  
 
The system should have the capability to re-route bags should part of the system have a 
problem such as a conveyor belt jam or screening machine breakdown.  The system 
should be able to re-route the bags so that the processing remains active. 
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The location of the system is important in that the needs of the airport are dynamic.  The 
passenger flow among the airlines as well as the number of airlines will most likely 
change with time.  This flexibility with respect to the location of the system should allow 
for these changes. 
 
Back-up systems are important to keep the bag screening operation running even though 
one or more sub-systems may fail.   
 
The technology of the explosive detection systems, trace detection, and other screening 
devices are improving over time.  The system should be flexible with respect to the 
ability to replace and incorporate the latest approved technology. 
 
Shut-down procedures need to be addressed within the system.  This includes procedures 
to handle shut-downs caused from both a positive hit to an alarm and machine 
breakdowns.  This is related to the back-up systems. 
 
The system should be upgradeable.  As discussed with the inevitable changes and 
improvement in technology the baggage screening system needs to allow for upgrades.   
 
The system should be expandable.  The number and sizes of the airlines could quite 
possibly increase and a system that allows for expansion to accommodate this increase is 
desired. 
 
The system should be scalable to accommodate lower passenger loads and the difference 
in loads between the airlines.  During off-peak times, lower staff numbers should be 
needed and the system should accommodate the change to the lower staff.   
 
PASSENGER IMPACT 
 
 Clarity of use 
 Number of times handing the bag 
 Visibility of bags 
 Customer hassle 
  Queues, lines, time, overall time, least amount of changes, straight line 
from point A to B 
 Passenger confidence 
 Passenger convenience 
 Visibility of security 
 Integrated with check point 
 
The following was discussed for the first tier objective, Passenger Impact. 
 
A simple system that is as straight forward to the passenger as possible is most desirable.   
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The number of times the passenger is required to handle his/her bag should be limited as 
well as the distance that the passenger must hand carry them within the airport. 
 
The combination of the number of times the passengers have to carry their bags along 
with the number of queues, and the additional distance involved in processing the 
passengers roll into the hassle factor.    
 
The visibility of the bags is important in that the passenger can observe that the security 
measures are performed effectively. 
 
The passenger should receive confidence that the system is providing them protection.  
Part of this confidence is created by the visibility of the security.  That can be created 
through closed circuit television monitors, or presentation boards that display the routing 
and screening process. 
 
The convenience to the passenger is important and that is affected by the amount of 
hassle they have to put up with. 
 
The bag screening process should be integrated into the passenger screening checkpoint 
EFFICIENCY 
 
 Bottlenecks, logistical issues, don’t forget these 
 Flow efficiency/congestion at the end of the system 
 Impact on airline staff 
 Number of times airline handling bags 
 Efficient, throughput 
 Automated kick off for flagged bag 
 Uninterrupted flow 
 Space utilization 
 Different run speeds 
 Reaction to first hit 
 Flow assurity – the bags to the right place 
 
The following was discussed for the first tier objective Efficient 
 
It’s important that the system doesn’t have bottlenecks that create backups, inefficient use 
of the screening machines, and delay to the bag process times.    
 
The system should have an efficient flow that avoids congestion after the bags are 
screened.    A build up of bags will create delays in the transfer of the bags to the planes 
and impact the airlines departure times.  
 
The impact to the airline staff should be kept to a minimum and allow for 
accommodation for the various peak passenger flow times. 
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Handling of the bags by the airline staff will impact the number of airline personnel 
needed to handle passengers. 
 
Utilization of the airport building space for the system is important.  Building space was 
limited prior to the additional screening requirements and now it’s even more important 
to avoid using more space than necessary.   
 
The throughput of the bags should be done in an efficient manner. 
An automated kick off capability is important to allow for additional screening of flagged 
bags while not hindering the flow of the other bags. 
 
The uninterrupted flow capability is important.   
 
The bags ultimately need to get to their final destinations.  Part of this issue is having a 
system that can maintain an accurate accountability/identification of baggage throughout 
the screening process. 
 
SECURITY 
 
 Security of equipment 
 Vulnerability 
 Visibility of equipment – mental benefit (moved to passenger confidence) 
 Alarm resolution 
 Isolation capability of a major hit/security breech 
 
The following was discussed for the first tier objective Security 
 
The vulnerability of the equipment is important.  It’s desirable to locate the screening 
system in an area with non-public access or the security identification display area 
(SIDA). 
 
It’s important that the system accommodates the various levels of alarm resolutions.  (Not 
sure what else we were saying here?) 
 
The isolation capability is desired to handle major hits/threats while allowing the 
remaining system and bag flow to continue.    
 
RELIABILITY (need new name, broader, maybe suitability) 
 
 Reliability, maintainability, availability stuff, RM&A 
 Safety 
 Exposure to radiation 
 Comfort of screeners 
 Environment of screeners 
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The following was discussed for the first tier objective Reliability 
Reliability: It’s important that the system is able to perform without breakdowns from 
machine failure or overburden by bag flow 
 
Maintainability: The system should allow for trained personnel to perform routine work 
on it to keep it running as close to its original or new operating state. 
 
Availability: It’s important that the system be able operate when needed.      
 
The safety to the personnel operating the screening systems is important.  The system 
should be designed to allow for access to the system to resolve jams, maintain and 
operate equipment with the risk of injury kept to a minimum. 
 
The environment and comfort of the screeners is important.  It’s important that the 
system has an environment which accommodates the shift durations of the operators.  
Uncomfortable work conditions for the system operators could result in improperly 
screened bags as well as slow process times. 
Part of the safety issue is the protection of the screening machine operators from radiation 
exposure.  The system should allow for the accurate monitoring and protection of the 
operators to avoid this danger. 
 
COST (the airport is considered a money maker for the city and thus is operated in this 
manner, to max profit) 
 
 Personnel 
 Money 
 Infrastructure 
 
Cost is viewed from the standpoint that the airport is a business and it’s intended to make 
a profit. The staff required to maintain, operate, and resolve problems/issues created from 
the system is important.  This staff includes those of the airlines, airport, and the TSA.  
The personnel will have both an annual and training requirement.  The training required 
will be impacted by the complexity of the system for its operation and maintenance.  
 
OPEN ITEMS: 
The next meeting will begin with a review of the affinity diagram values.  The bottom 
tiers of the value hierarchy including measures will be developed at the next meetings.  
Next week’s meeting for the Integrated Study Team was tentatively set for Wednesday 
22 JAN at 1pm.  A group email with next meeting’s agenda and location will be sent to 
all group members no later than Monday 20 Jan.  
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)  
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS  
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY 
 
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #3, 22 JAN 03 
 
TIME: 1300-1700 
 
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations Conference Room 
 
ATTENDEES: 
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT 
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT 
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer 
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. Doug Warner, Dayton International Airport, Facilities 
Mr. David Meek, Chief of Baggage Screeners, TSA 
 
PURPOSE: 
Continue with and finish the development of the 100% checked baggage system value 
hierarchy.  Begin the development of measures. 
 
OPENING DISCUSSION: 
The minutes of the previous meeting were discussed.  The research timeline was 
introduced with the following items.   
 
Develop and Verify Hierarchy  14 / 22 JAN 03 
Develop Measures    22 / 29 JAN 03 
Weight Hierarchy    5 FEB 03 
Score and Analyze Options   5 FEB 03 
 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
 
The first tier objectives of the 100 percent checked baggage system hierarchy was 
decomposed down to sub-objectives that could be measured.  The development of the 
hierarchy was completed during the meeting; measures were defined for the Security sub 
objectives.  There was not time to finish the development of measures for the other 
branches.   
 
The group reviewed the first tier of the hierarchy developed during the previous meeting. 
The first tier objectives were then addressed individually along with the associated sub-
objectives groups introduced during the last meeting.  The group decided to separate the 
costs from the original hierarchy and establish a separate hierarchy for cost. 
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The first tier objective Efficient was broken into three sub-objectives.  They are flow, 
manpower, and space.  Flow is the value for a fast through put of the checked bags, free 
of congestion, uninterrupted between check in and the end of the screening.  This flow 
also includes the need for assurance that the bags are getting to the right place.  
Manpower is the value to limit the amount of personnel needed for handling and 
screening.  Space is the value to avoid congestion. 
 
The first tier objective for Security was broken down into five sub objectives.  They are 
Equipment Vulnerability, Equipment Capability, Isolation Capability, Alarm Resolution, 
and Manpower Impact.  Equipment Vulnerability is the value of having a system that is 
closed off from public access.  Equipment Capability is the ability of a screening system 
to detect explosives, the speed of processing bags and the reliability that the system will 
be available.  Isolation Capability is the ability of the system to separate a bag from the 
flow of bags so as not to impede bag processing.  Alarm Resolution is the ability of the 
explosives detection equipment to assist operators in resolving alarms (alert by screening 
machine that a threat has been detected.)  The Manpower Impact is the value to limit the 
personnel needed to maintain, operate, and resolve issues that result from the use of the 
checked bag system. 
 
The first tier objective for Ease of Operation was broken down into five sub objectives.  
They are Safety, Comfort, Maintainability, Availability, and Reliability.   
 
The first tier objective for Flexibility was broken down into three sub objectives.  They 
are Robustness, Expandable, and Automation. 
 
The first tier objective for Cost was broken down into three sub objectives.  They are 
People, Infrastructure, and Acquisition.   
 
The group focused on the Security tier and began to develop measures.  These measures 
were developed as follows: 
 
Equipment Vulnerability: Yes/No for Public Access.  If the system is located in a 
Security Identification Display Area then the value is 1.0. If the public does have access 
then the value is 0. 
Equipment Capability: Two measures were developed, Catch Rate and False Alarm Rate.  
Isolation Capability: Yes/No for Isolation Capable.  If the system is capable of isolated 
bags such as the latest screening machines from Invision then the value is 1.0, if the 
system is not capable of isolating the bags then the value is 0. 
Need to develop measures for these two sub objectives. 
Alarm Resolution and Manpower Impact. 
 
OPEN ITEMS: 
The measures need to be developed for remaining lowest tier sub-objectives for the other 
branches of the 100 percent checked baggage and cost hierarchies.  Next week’s meeting 
for the Integrated Study Team was tentatively set for Wednesday 29 JAN at 1pm.   
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)  
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS  
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY 
 
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #4, 29 JAN 03 
 
TIME: 1300-1600 
 
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations 5th Floor Conference Room 
 
ATTENDEES: 
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT 
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT 
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT 
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer 
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. Bob Hall, Continental Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. David Meek, TSA DAY 
 
PURPOSE: 
Continue with the development of the 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy.  
Review those measures already proposed and develop measures for those sub-objectives 
not addressed yet.   
 
OPENING DISCUSSION: 
 
The 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy developed from the last meeting on 
22 Jan 03 was provided to begin the review.  Each first tier objective of this hierarchy 
was reviewed briefly along with their corresponding sub-objectives and measures.  The 
group then continued to develop measures.   
 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
 
Updates to the hierarchy are described below under their first tier objective.   
 
SECURITY: 
The security objective from the last meeting had five sub-objectives.  Measures were 
developed for those sub-objectives as follows: 
 
Equipment Vulnerability:  
The value for equipment vulnerability is measured by whether the system is in a public 
access area of the airport or a Security Identification Display Area (SIDA).  A value of 1 
is given to a system that is not accessible by the public.  A value of 0 is given to a system 
that is accessible to the public.   
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Equipment Capability: 
The value for equipment capability is measured by the system’s average detection rate 
and false alarm rates. The detection rate is the percentage of threats correctly identified 
based on red team inspections. The detection rate measure has an x-axis that ranges from 
the minimum acceptable detection rate to 100% detection.  The minimum acceptable 
detection rate may be as high as 90% in that case the x axis would only cover a range of 
10% (Difference between 90% detection and perfect 100%).  The corresponding y-axis 
ranges from 0 to 1(representing the value).  The minimum detection has a value of 0 
while the 100% detection has a value of 1.  The group decided that at 95% of the gap the 
corresponding value would be 0.66. The value will increase in a positive exponential 
manner as shown in the figure below.   
   
False Alarm Rate   
The false alarm rate is the number of bags that are incorrectly identified with threats 
divided by the total number of bags screened.  The most preferred false alarm rate is 0% 
and is given a value of 1.0.  The least preferred false alarm rate is 40 %.  The 40% is used 
as a ‘best guess’ to current minimum performance of initial alarms that are resolved and 
found to be false alarms. 
 
Isolation Capability: 
 
The value for isolation capability is measured by whether the system is capable of 
isolating bags that have shown positive.  The isolation capability is desired and if the 
system has this capability the value is 1.0.  If it’s not isolation capable then the value is 0.   
 
Alarm Resolution:  
The value for alarm resolution is measured by the percentage of alarms that are able to be 
resolved without removing the bags from the screening machines. The value for alarm 
resolution increases in an exponential manner as the percentage of threats resolved 
increases.  A value of 0.5 is obtained for a system that resolves 30% of the alarms.  A 
value of 0.9 is obtained from a system that is able to resolve 90% of the alarms. 
 
Manpower Impact:  This sub-objective was removed from Security and will be 
addressed within the Cost Hierarchy.   
 
PASSENGER IMPACT: 
The Passenger Impact objective is broken down into confidence and convenience.   
 
The study group decided to define the confidence sub-objective down into communicate 
security which is defined by whether the system allows the passenger to see the bag 
screening and routing operation.  This can be accomplished through either a closed circuit 
television, windows that allow the customers to see the operation, or a display that 
illustrates the route and screening measures in place at the airport.   
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Visible System: 
If the bag screening system has one of the three methods in place to communicate the 
security then the value is 1.0.  If the system is not visible and hidden from the passenger 
then that is given a value of 0.  
 
The convenience part of the passenger impact is broken down into sub-objectives for 
handling bags and time.   
 
Distance 
The distance that the passenger has to move checked bag in screening process  It is 
preferred to have a system that will not require the passengers to move their bags at all 
after checking them in at the airline ticket counter.   A system that requires passengers to 
move their bags 100 feet or more receives a value of 0.0.  A system that does not require 
passengers to move their bags after check in receives a value of 1.0. 
 
Times Handled 
The number of times the passenger has to move checked bag from one screening station 
to another before screeners take custody of the bag.  Having to move bags a number of 
different times between security stations is considered an inconvenience as was the 
distance required to move the bags.  Not handling the bags at all after tagging receives a 
value of 1.0. Handling them once receives a value of 0.5 and handling them more than 
once receives a value of 0.0.   
 
Time in Line 
While the group felt passengers do understand and appreciate the need for security, their 
patience is not unlimited.  Not waiting with the bags at all is the most preferred and 
receives a value of 1.0.  For each minute the passenger waits the value decreases linearly 
up to 15 minutes or more when the value is 0.0 
 
EFFICIENT: 
 
The group divided the first tier objective Efficient into three sub-objectives.  These are 
Flow, Manpower, and Space.  Flow is measured by both time it takes on average for the 
bags to complete its movement through the system as well as how the bags are delivered 
to the Airlines baggage handlers. 
 
Flow 
The flow is further defined by the time the bags take to be processed from the point of 
being tagged by the airline ticket personnel and reaching the make up room.  The bag 
delivery method is also used to define flow.   
 
Time  
Throughput of the baggage with emphasis to avoid congestion, bottlenecks, and 
interruption.    
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Bag Delivery Method 
The greatest value for the baggage delivery method is from a system that sends screened 
bags to separate baggage handling areas for each airline.  This method receives a value of 
1.0.  The second most preferential delivery setting is for a common make-up room for all 
airlines but with sorted areas for each airline’s bags.  This method receives a value of 0.8.  
The least preferred delivery method is for all bags to be delivered to a common make up 
room and not sorted by airline.  This method receives a value of 0.0. 
 
Manpower 
Personnel fluctuations necessary to accommodate the varying passenger load.  The 
manpower sub-objective value is measured by the fluctuation in number of operators 
necessary to support the system.  No fluctuation is most preferred and receives a value of 
1.0.  A system that requires minor fluctuations in personnel levels is the second most 
preferred, receiving a value of 0.8.  Minor fluctuations are variations of ten percent or 
less.  A system that requires major fluctuation in personnel is the least preferred and 
receives a value of 0.0.  Major fluctuations are personnel variations of more than 10 
percent. 
 
Space 
 
The value for the space sub-objective is measured by whether additional floor space will 
be needed to be constructed to support the operation.  It is most preferred to have a 
system that requires no terminal floor space; such a system would receive a value of 1.0.  
The second most preferred system would take up no more floor space than currently 
available to conduct baggage screening in the lobby area without changing the existing 
floor layout.  That system would receive a value of 0.5.  The least preferred system would 
require more floor space than is currently used and that system would receive a value of 
0.0  
 
At this point the group ended the meeting 
 
OPEN ITEMS: 
In an effort to make an efficient use of the next meeting it was suggested to send out a 
request for input on the remaining measures.  The Ease of Operation and Flexibility 
branches haven’t had measures developed for their lowest tier sub-objective.   
 
All members of the study group have been asked to forward any recommendations on the 
remaining objectives that need to have measures developed to Capt Meade.  In addition, 
any questions on the objectives and measures already developed should also be sent.  
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AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)  
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS  
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY 
 
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #5, 05 FEB 03 
 
TIME: 1300-1600 
 
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations 5th Floor Conference Room 
 
ATTENDEES: 
Capt Stephen Chambal, AFIT 
Dr. Dick Deckro, AFIT 
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT 
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer 
Mr. Ronnie Wayne, Delta Airline Manager, Dayton International Airport 
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations 
 
PURPOSE: 
The development of the 100 percent checked baggage system value hierarchy has been 
completed.  Measures were also developed for several of the lowest tier sub-objectives.  
Measures will be developed during this meeting for the Ease of Operation and Flexibility 
branches of the 100 percent checked baggage system value hierarchy and the cost 
hierarchy.   
  
OPENING DISCUSSION: 
 
The cost objectives were removed from the 100 percent checked baggage system 
hierarchy.  These cost objectives will be used for a separate cost hierarchy.  The group 
started with the 100 percent checked baggage system hierarchy and finished development 
of the measures.  The group then moved to the Cost hierarchy and finished development 
of all measures. 
  
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
 
Updates to the hierarchy are described below under their first tier objective.   
 
EASE OF OPERATION: 
The safety and comfort for the operators of the baggage screening system along with the 
maintainability, availability, and reliability 
 
Safety 
Number of features above Minimum Required, Safety.  Example of feature includes a 
conveyor shut down switches that isolates portion of the baggage systems while allowing 
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other parts of the conveyor to continue operating. Each feature above zero receives a 
value increment of 0.2.  Five or more features receives a value of 1.0 
 
Comfort  
Number of Features above Minimum Required, Comfort. Example includes item such as 
screening system monitors with reduced glare to reduce eye strain and will lead to more 
attentive operators.  Each feature above zero receives a value increment of 0.2.  Five or 
more features receives a value of 1.0 
 
Maintainability / Availability 
The average time for repairs to the system.  A repair that takes more than 24 hours is 
considered unacceptable and would receive a value of 0.0.  The most preferred repair 
time of 1 hour or less receives a value of 1.0.  A repair time of 1 to 8 hours receives a 
value of 0.5.  A system that has average repairs of 8 to 24 hours receives a value of 0.2. 
 
Reliability 
The number of breakdowns between normally scheduled maintenance downtime is the 
measure for reliability.  A system that averages no breakdowns within the maintenance 
cycle receives a value of 1.0.  A system with 3 or more breakdowns on average per 
month is considered unacceptable and receives a value of 0.0.  A system that has an 
average of one breakdown receives a value of 0.5. A system that has an average of two 
breakdowns receives a value of 0.2. 
 
FLEXIBILITY 
The capability of adapting to new, different, or changing requirements 
 
Conveyor Redundancy 
Measure is how many back up measures are available on the conveyor system in case of a 
conveyor breakdown.  The most preferred realistic number of redundant conveyor system 
is 3 or more for the Dayton International Airport.  This system receives a value of 1.0.  
The least preferred option is for the checked baggage system to have no redundant 
conveyor systems.  This system receives a value of 0.0.   
 
Detection Redundancy 
Measure is how many back up detection systems are available to screen bags identified as 
threats.  A system that has 3 or more redundant detection features is most preferred and 
receives a value of 1.0.  The least preferred option is for the checked baggage system to 
have no redundant detection systems.  This system receives a value of 0.0.   
 
Expandable 
It is most preferred to have a checked baggage system that can be expanded to take on a 
larger passenger load accommodating any expansion in passenger loads and air carriers.  
This is a yes/no measure.  If the system can be expanded it receives a value of 1.0.  If it 
can not be expanded, it receives a value of 0.0. 
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Automation 
 
Tracking 
It is preferred to have a checked baggage system that is capable of tracking bags in the 
screening process and can tell where a checked bag is located.  This like the expandable 
measure, is a yes no measure.  A system that automatically tracks checked bags gets a 
value of 1.0 and a system that is not capable of tracking automatically gets a 0.0 
. 
Routing Divert 
The study group prefers a checked baggage system is capable of automatically routing 
and diverting bags.  Such automated handling reduces personnel needs and, when 
properly implemented, provides better service than manual handling.  If the system can 
automatically route and divert is gets a value of 1.0 and if it can not it gets a value of 0.0 
 
Sort to Airline Make-up room 
If the system is capable of automatically sorting bags to airline make up rooms it gets a 
value of 1.0 if not it gets a value of 0.0. 
 
COST 
 
People 
The personnel necessary to operate the system.  The most preferred number of operators 
is 3 which receive a value of 1.0.  The least preferred is 10 or more operators which 
receives a value of 0.  The value decreases linearly as the number of operators increases 
from 3 to 10. 
 
Infrastructure 
The level of construction necessary to install the system.  A system that can be installed 
without construction to the facility is most preferred and receives a value of 1.0.  A 
system that requires minor work receives a value of 0.5 and major work gets a value of 
0.0.  
 
Acquisition 
The purchases made for a system which includes conveyor systems, display monitors.   
.  A system that will not incur any cost to the Airport for these items is the most preferred 
and receives a value of 1.0.  A system that requires 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) or more is 
the least preferred and receives a value of 0.0.  As the cost for these items moves from 
zero dollars to 1.5 Million dollars (NPV) the value decreases linearly 
 
OPEN ITEMS: 
 
Both hierarchies need to be given weights by the decision maker.  The next meeting will 
include Jon Vrabel and Youseff Elzein, who will weigh the hierarchies on behalf of Mr. 
Eugene Conrad. 
102  
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (AFIT)  
DAYTON INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT STAKEHOLDERS  
CHECKED BAGGAGE SYSTEM STUDY 
 
INTEGRATED STUDY TEAM MEETING #6, 14 FEB 03 
 
TIME: 1000-1200 
 
PLACE: Dayton International Airport, Airport Operations 5th Floor Conference Room 
 
ATTENDEES: 
Capt Quincy Meade, AFIT 
Mr. Youseff Elzein, Dayton International Airport, Senior Engineer 
Mr. Jon Vrabel, Dayton International Airport, Operations 
 
PURPOSE: 
Weight both the 100% checked baggage system value hierarchy and cost hierarchy.   
 
OPENING DISCUSSION: 
 
The hierarchy objectives were reviewed.  This was brief, as both Jon and Youseff took 
part in each phase of the value model development and were already familiar with the 
model.  The 100 marble method was then used to provide direct weighting to each 
objective and measure of the hierarchy.   
 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS: 
 
Capt Meade recorded the local weights as provided by Jon Vrabel and Youseff Elzein.  
These weights would be converted to global weights and input into the Logical Decisions 
for Windows software to analyze two notional alternatives.  
 
The Passenger Impact and Flexibility tier objectives received 0.25 of the weight each.  
They were deemed the most important to the Director of Aviation.  The Ease of 
Operation objective was given a weight of 0.20. The Efficient objective was given a 
weight of 0.17.  The Security objective was given a weight of 0.13.  Security was given 
the least weight but this is not because security is not important.  The security objectives 
provide value to capabilities above and beyond the minimum accepted criteria of the 
FAA and TSA.  These minimum accepted standards are considered stringent.  Therefore 
the other objectives were given more weight.  The Passenger Impact and Flexibility 
objectives were given the most weight because they were seen as the most important to 
the passengers and the ability to accommodate various passenger loads.  The Ease of 
Operation objective was given more weight than the Efficient objective because the 
standards for the workers were deemed as more important than the Efficient objectives. 
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Potential 100 percent checked baggage system alternatives were discussed.  It was 
decided to use the current Terminal Floor system as well as a notional Inline system.  The 
inline system would be integrated into a checked baggage system.  Capt Meade would 
use the preferences identified by the study group for the notional inline baggage 
screening system.   
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